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PUTTING "DUTY" IN ITS PLACE: A REPLY TO
PROFESSORS GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY
Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating*
In an earlier article,' we argued that California courts have been
proliferating "no duty" decisions and that these decisions distort the
concept of duty, deform the substance of negligence law and
disrespect the role of the jury. We began our paper with an account
of the prevailing-and we think correct-understanding of the place
of duty in negligence law. The role of duty doctrine, we claimed, is
to fix the legal standard applicable to the defendant's conduct.2
Therefore, duty rulings normally are and normally ought to be both
rare and relatively general. We went on to argue that California
courts have developed a bad habit of "abusing 'duty"'-of using the
doctrine's status as a question of law for the courts as cover for
issuing highly particularized rulings which reach no farther than the
preferred outcome in the case at bar.
Duty rulings should be rare because "the general rule"-both in
California and throughout the United States-is that "all persons
have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured
as the result of their conduct."3 Departures from this default standard
. Dilan A. Esper is a lawyer with Stein & Flugge in Los Angeles. Gregory C. Keating is
the Academic Associate Dean and William T. Dalessi Professor of Law and Philosophy at the
Gould School of Law at the University of Southern California. We are grateful to Larry
Alexander, Scott Bice, Jim Fleming, John Goldberg, Mike Green, David Lyons, Ken Simons,
Catherine Wells, Ben Zipursky; to workshop participants at Boston College Law School and
Boston University Law School; and to the participants in this conference and the editors of this
journal for many helpful comments. Errors remain ours.
1. Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty," 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265 (2006)
[hereinafter Abusing "Duty '].
2. The proposition that the role of duty is to fix the legal standard governing the
defendant's conduct is the kind of black-letter law that courts cite when they list the elements of
negligence liability. See, e.g., Talton v. Amall Golden Gregory, LLP, 622 S.E.2d 589, 591 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2005) ("In order to maintain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must be able to
prove that the defendant owed a legally cognizable duty to the plaintiff to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, the defendant breached this duty, and the breach damaged the plaintiff."
(citation omitted)).
3. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1997); see also
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of obligation ought to be infrequent. Only a relatively small number
of recurring social interactions justify either stiffening or relaxing the
normal obligation of reasonable care. Ski lift operators may owe
their patrons duties of utmost care because they are in exclusive
control of a dangerous instrumentality, whereas football players may
owe each other no duties of ordinary care because the exercise of
ordinary care would impair the vigorous play of the game, but these
are each exceptional circumstances. Duty rulings should be
relatively general because the role of duty is to fix the standard of
care owed by some class of potential injurers (e.g., common carriers,
experts, participants in a sporting competition, or sellers of
prescription drugs) for some recurring risk imposition. Put
differently, the role of duty rulings is to articulate law. Highly
specific rulings do not articulate law, because they do not state
general norms for the governance of conduct.
"No duty" rulings are, of course, the flip side of duty rulings.
Instead of subjecting actors to obligation, "no duty" rulings exempt
actors from obligation. "A man is entitled to be as negligent as he
pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them."4 In a
sea of general duty, islands of "no duty" must, by logical necessity,
be less general than the duty of care that they suspend. But even "no
duty" rulings must fix the rights and responsibilities of persons with
enough generality to govern a discernible domain of conduct.
Whatever the merits of no duty to trespassers may be as a rule of tort
law, such a rule defines an identifiable class of persons toward whom
owners of real property may be as negligent as they please.' The
intensely particular rulings now being issued by California courts fail
this test. Representative rulings hold that mass transit agencies owe
a general duty of care to passengers exiting and entering trains, but
"no duty" to an inebriated passenger whom it has escorted off the
train once he is on the platform;6 that drivers owe general duties of
care to other drivers but "no duty" to change lanes when traveling at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West 2002) (originally enacted in 1872, prescribing that everyone
owes to everyone else a duty of ordinary care); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM ch. 7, scope note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stressing that, when
negligent conduct causes physical harm, duty can usually be assumed to exist).
4. Le Lievre v. Gould, (1893) 1 Q.B. 491, 497.
5. Id.
6. McGettigan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 518 (Ct. App. 1997).
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a legal speed in either the No. 2 lane or No. 3 lane of a four-lane
freeway at night, on dry pavement, in light traffic and clear weather;7
that businesses owe general duties of care to protect customers on
their premises from assault at the hands of third parties but "no duty"
to protect a customer's life by "comply[ing] with the unlawful
demand of an armed robber that property be surrendered,"8 and so
on.
Duty doctrine demands wholesale judgments about the law
controlling the case. Is that law tort, contract or property, or no law
at all? Contemporary California rulings are retail judgments about
appropriate conduct on the specific facts at hand. Duty is about the
existence of obligation in tort-about whether people should be
expected to exercise reasonable care to avoid harming others who
might otherwise be endangered by their conduct. Intensely particular
"no duty" decisions do not make credible claims about the existence
of obligation. What sense they make, they make as claims about
responsibility "all things considered"-about whether these
defendants did behave reasonably in the specific circumstances at
hand. Monreal v. Tobin is instructive.9
Construed as a true duty decision, Monreal establishes a barely
discernible sliver of license in a sea of obligation.'" Drivers owe to
anyone foreseeably jeopardized by their driving a general duty to
7. Monreal v. Tobin, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168, 176 (Ct. App. 1998).
8. Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Cal. 1997). It
can be difficult to locate the seam between the general duty of a business to exercise care to keep
its customers safe from (among other things) intentional injury at the hands of third parties on the
premises, and the business' exemption from any such duty when an armed robber makes an
unlawful demand for the business' property. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the
court expressly reserves judgment on whether "the right of any person to defend property with
reasonable force ... is qualified by the duty to avoid injury to third persons or if a duty exists to
avoid physical resistance that might provoke a robber into carrying out a threat to harm third
persons." Id. at 1269-70. The set of specific fact patterns that may be subject to diverse duties as
a matter of law appears open ended. Duty is set to swallow breach. In Castaneda v. Olsher, 162
P.3d 610, 616 (Cal. 2007), duty does swallow breach:
The duty analysis we have developed requires the court in each case (whether trial or appellate) to
identify the specific action or actions the plaintiff claims the defendant had a duty to undertake.
"Only after the scope of the duty under consideration is defined may a court meaningfully
undertake the balancing analysis of the risks and burdens present in a given case to determine
whether the specific obligations should or should not be imposed . I.." Id  (citation omitted)This
inquiry into the merits of a particular precaution is the heart of breach analysis, properly
conceived. For a further discussion of the "untaken precaution," see Mark F. Grady, Untaken
Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
9. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168.
10. Id.
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exercise reasonable care in the circumstances." But the "driver of a
vehicle traveling at the posted maximum speed limit in either the No.
2 lane or No. 3 lane of a dry and straight four-lane freeway, at night,
and in light traffic during clear weather"12 owes "no duty" "to other
drivers and any involved passengers ... to move his or her vehicle to
the right into the next slower lane when another driver approaches
from behind in the same lane at a speed in excess of the posted
maximum speed limit.'
13
To say that a driver in the position of Luis Monreal may be "as
negligent as he pleases towards the whole world"' 4 of other drivers
who approach him "from behind in the same lane at a speed in
excess of the posted maximum speed limit"'5 while he is "traveling at
the posted maximum speed limit in either the No. 2 lane or No. 3
lane of a dry and straight four-lane freeway, at night, and in light
traffic during clear weather"'6 does more than draw laughter. It
misstates the plausible intuition at work. That intuition is that a
driver in Monreal's circumstances is, all things considered,
conducting himself reasonably when he does not change lanes. He is
not free of the obligation to be careful; he is free of fault, even the 6
percent of fault found by the trier of fact in the case. 7 But this is not
a judgment of "no duty," it is a judgment of "no breach as a matter of
law." There is a world of difference between saying that someone is
not subject to any obligation of due care at all and saying that it is
plainly evident that someone has discharged his obligation of due
care-so evident that no reasonable person could think him even a
little bit careless. Within the law of negligence, this difference,
moreover, is not merely conceptual. Questions of duty are for the
court. Questions of breach are for the jury-except in the rare and
special case where reasonable jurors could not disagree.'8
11. Id.
12. Id. at 170.
13. Id.
14. Le Lievre v. Gould (1983) 1 Q.B. 491, 497.
15. Monreal, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
16. Id.
17. Id. The court's confusion of"no duty" and "no breach as a matter of law" is betrayed by
its saying that it is deciding "whether a reasonably prudent driver" would change lanes in the
circumstances at hand. Id. This assumes the existence of a duty to drive reasonably and inquires
into what that duty demands on the precise facts of the case.
18. See Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 269 n. 12, 279-80. "No breach as a matter of law"
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Excessive particularity is not, however, the only fault to be
found in the California courts' burgeoning "no duty" decisions.
California courts are "abusing 'duty' in several other ways as well.
Chief among these is by espousing a version of assumption of risk
doctrine that conflates law articulation and law application. This
conflation prompts courts to take cases from juries on the theory that
both the articulation of the legal standard and its application to the
facts are matters for the court. 9 The resulting practice transgresses
the boundaries of judicial authority and usurps the legitimate
authority of the jury.
Law articulation is the proper domain of the judge and law
application is the proper domain of the jury. The latter is especially
true in negligence cases, governed as they are by the highly general,
morally inflected legal standard of reasonable care in the
circumstances. When reasonable people disagree over whether the
defendant exercised reasonable care in the circumstances at hand (or
over whether some risk is "inherent" in an activity) well-settled
doctrine holds that the matter is for juries-not judges-to decide.2"
Indeed, questions of breach in negligence law go to the jury even
when the facts are undisputed, as long as there is reasonable doubt
about the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct."
This deference to jury adjudication in the formal doctrine of
American negligence law is wholly appropriate. The legal duty of
"reasonable care" is an artificial, institutional elaboration of the
moral duty to respect the lives and property of others, and the idea of
"reasonable" care at the heart of negligence law is an extension and
special application of the "intuitive moral idea" of
"reasonableness."22 That intuitive idea is concerned with what we
rulings can articulate enduring rules spelling out the precise precaution that due care requires in
some recurring circumstance. The key to success here is finding a recurring circumstance and
matching it to an appropriate rule. The history of negligence law suggests that this is not easy to
do. See id. at 285-86. Understood as a "no breach as a matter of law" decision, Monreal appears
more defensible, though we doubt that the rule it states is likely to give guidance in many future
cases. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168. As an example of judicially fashioned rule which has stood the test
of time, consider the rule that baseball stadiums need only screen certain areas of the stands and
not others. See, e.g., Costa v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2004).
19. Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 296-300.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 269 n. 12 (citing Mark P. Gergen, The Jury s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in
the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 407, 424-39 (1999)).
22. JoHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 82 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
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owe to each other as members of a particular moral and legal
community. As far as negligence law is concerned, we act
reasonably when we take the risks of physical harm that our actions
impose on others and adjust our actions accordingly. We act
reasonably when the risks we impose can be justified to those on
whom they are imposed in accordance with fair principles of risk
imposition, principles that take adequate account of their right to the
physical integrity of their persons. Jury adjudication is a
procedurally fair and substantively democratic way of deciding how
this requirement that only reasonable risks be imposed bears on the
facts of particular cases.23 Put differently, jury adjudication is a
reasonable procedure for settling reasonable disagreement about
what we owe to each other in the way of careful conduct.
Formal doctrine, however, is one thing; present practice is
another. The vitality of jury adjudication in negligence cases
depends importantly on judges confining themselves to a properly
modest role. Here, the California courts' ongoing abuse of duty does
real damage. When duty is a live issue in every case, it is impossible
to draw a principled line between the provinces of judge and jury.
Judges are inevitably drawn into making their own judgments as to
whether the defendant exercised reasonable care, and lose sight of
the fact that their proper role is restricted to articulating the law
governing the case at hand and to policing the perimeters of jury law-
application.
The abuse of duty does not end with the demeaning of juries. In
a parallel usurpation of the legislative role, California courts also
treat their judicially fashioned "assumption of risk" doctrine as a
license to disregard statutorily recognized duties, thereby running
roughshod over legislatures as well as juries. 24 Careening on, they
have resuscitated "secondary" assumption of risk-the much and
rightly reviled nineteenth-century version of the assumption of risk
doctrine-under the name of "primary" assumption of risk.25 Last
but not least, California courts have begun a sub rosa resuscitation of
the status categories famously abandoned in Rowland v. Christian.26
(characterizing reasonableness as a "basic intuitive moral idea").
23. See Abusing "Duty, "supra note 1, at 279-81.
24. Id. at272, 305-310.
25. Id. at 305-10.
26. Id. at 313-18 (discussing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)).
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Viewed singly, California cases "abusing 'duty"' are highly
particularized releases of obligation-tickets good for only one ride
on the railroad, as Cardi and Green say in their contribution to this
debate.27 Viewed collectively, California cases appear in a different
light-not so much because they cumulate into larger rules, but
because they crop up most often in particular domains of tort law.
Assumption of risk and duties owed to entrants onto land are the
primary (though hardly the exclusive) domains of California's
burgeoning "no duty" jurisprudence. By virtue of their location
within the larger landscape of the law of torts, these highly particular
rulings have a broader-if ill-formed--effect on the contours of civil
obligation in California. "No duty" doctrines that waned throughout
the twentieth century are now waxing.28  Inchoately and
incompletely, California courts are reconfiguring twenty-first-
century tort law by resuscitating nineteenth-century doctrines.
The doctrines that California courts are reviving thus trace a
troubling whole. They devalue the physical integrity of the person
and exalt both unfettered dominion over real property and
unrestrained freedom of economic activity. No rational person
values her property or her wealth more than her life, and no
reasonable democratic citizen publicly asserts that her property or
her wealth is more valuable than the lives and wealth of her fellow
equal citizens. Nonetheless, California tort law is beginning to value
some people's property and wealth more than other people's lives.
By granting property and contractual interests priority over physical
integrity, the more important interests of some are subordinated to
the less important interests of others.
The remedy for this abusive use of duty is a simple one, or so
we argued. California courts must resume making duty decisions in
an appropriately categorical way. Duty doctrine must be used:
(1) to fix the boundaries among contract, tort, property and
27. Jonathan Cardi & Michael Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671 (2008) [hereinafter
Duty Wars]. Indeed, Cardi and Green's remarks do not go quite far enough. The rulings that we
criticize are for defendants only and, for the defendants lucky enough to win them, these are old-
fashioned Disneyland "E tickets", good for the best ride the tort system has to offer.
28. California is not the only jurisdiction to revive no-duty doctrines. See, e.g., Stockberger
v. United States, 332 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that under Indiana law, employer had
no duty to prevent employee from driving in a hypoglycemia-induced "unresponsive,
agitated .... erratic[]" state). In California, the no-duty doctrine has also notably reappeared in
Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
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legally unregulated conduct; and
(2) to articulate the more particular standards of care owed
by certain well-defined social roles and activities (e.g., by
ski lift operators, within sporting activities); or incurred by
certain undertakings (e.g., by entering into various "special
relationships").
In those broad areas where the legal standard governing the
defendant's conduct is well settled-when contract and property are
out of the picture and a well-articulated tort standard of care is firmly
in control of the terrain-the only recurring responsibility of duty
doctrine is to identify those cases where the conduct of the defendant
is unregulated by law because the risk of harm is so remote.
Put differently, the role of duty in this domain is merely to
identify those risks that are not "reasonably foreseeable" and to
curtail further, pointless inquiry into whether such unforeseeable
risks should have been guarded against. Reasonable foreseeability of
harm to someone is, in general, sufficient to trigger a duty of care
because people have a shared and urgent interest in avoiding physical
harm. The prospect of physical injury generally does suffice-and
generally should suffice-to activate the obligation of reasonable
care.
In proposing a limited role for "reasonable foreseeability" in
duty decisions, we were (and are) rejecting the position of the current
draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm
("Third Restatement"),29  which proposes that all questions
concerning foreseeability should be handled under the breach
element of a negligence claim. But our disagreement with the Third
Restatement should not be exaggerated. We are sympathetic to the
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7(a) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005) ("An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's
conduct creates a risk of physical harm."). This provision shifts questions of foreseeability from
duty to breach, where the standard applied to the review of jury decisions would be a "no
reasonable jury" standard. This standard ought to be far more constraining of judicial discretion
than a standard which holds that duty is a question of law for courts. We agree that in the vast
majority of cases foresecability should be reserved for the jury as part of the inquiries into breach
and/or "proximate" causation. We think it cannot be wholly eliminated from duty because people
cannot reasonably be asked to guard against a risk of physical injury when they cannot reasonably
be expected to foresee any risk of injury at all from their conduct, and because a limited role for
foreseeability is consistent with the results of some important and celebrated cases. For defense
of this proposal of the Third Restatement, see W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58
vAND. L. REv. 739 (2005); see also W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L.
REv. 921 (2005).
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spirit of the Third Restatement's proposal-namely, to limit the
opportunity for judges to take cases from juries by manipulating the
concept of foreseeability. Moreover, we understand the impulse to
shift all questions of foreseeability of harm into the element of
breach. Harms are rarely so unforeseeable that no care should be
taken to prevent them. Slotting issues of foreseeability into the law
of breach highlights this important truth, and might well flush out
judicial abuses of power masked by the doctrine that duty is a
question of law for the courts.3"
Notwithstanding these attractions, however, the Third
Restatement's proposal has two drawbacks. The first is that
foreseeability of harm is fundamental to the expansion of duty
throughout the twentieth century. Tort pushed back both property
and contract throughout the twentieth century because the great cases
of twentieth century tort law "put aside the notion that the duty to
safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may
be foreseen, grows out of contract"3 and replaced it with the notion
that reasonable foreseeability of harm itself suffices to trigger a duty
of care. Divorcing duty from foreseeability writes great cases, such
as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co32 and Heaven v. Pender,33 out of
the law of duty. Yet these cases are the fonts and foundation of
modem doctrine, and rightly so. Making reasonable foreseeability of
harm the touchstone of obligation in tort captures a powerful and
sound moral intuition: that the physical integrity of the person is an
interest urgent enough to bound both the free use of real property and
the free play of market forces. Dominion over things and the pursuit
of rational self-interest on mutually advantageous terms must both be
limited by the rights of others to the physical integrity of their
persons.
The second drawback of the Third Restatement's proposal is that
negligence law asks each of us to moderate the pursuit of our own
interests in light of the legitimate interests of others. We cannot
reasonably be asked to guard against harms that we cannot
30. See Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 729 ("The malleability of foreseeability also provides a
cover for courts to obscure the real reasons for their decisions."). Cardi and Green characterize
their disagreement with us as limited. See id. at 724-26.
31. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
32. Id. at 1050.
33. Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503.
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reasonably be expected to foresee. Reasonable foreseeability of
harm is a necessary precondition of reasonable care. Imposing
obligations to guard against injuries that are not reasonably
foreseeable demands "that people do more than take the legitimate
claims of others into account"3 4; it holds people responsible for
failing to prevent harms they could not reasonably have anticipated.
To demand that people prevent the unforeseeable violates cardinal
principles of legality and responsibility, yet that is what severing
duty from foreseeability does.3"
Our arguments have not gone unchallenged. In Shielding Duty,
their Comment on our Article, John Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky ("Goldberg and Zipursky") express skepticism about our
argument in three principal ways.36 First, they argue that our
criticism of the excessive particularity of California courts' duty
rulings "is severely underspecified because [we] never explain the
level of categorization that [we] have in mind, nor the reasons
favoring one level of categorization over another."37 Second, they
"see no reason to suppose that, were the California courts to aspire to
34. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 106 (1998). The Third
Restatement is preoccupied not with "duty as obligation" but with "duty as exemption"-with,
well, "no duty." We share its disapproval of the pretense involved in many "duty as exemption"
rulings, where some unstated policy preference seems to hide behind an implausible declaration
of "unforeseeability." But we think that the default rule that there generally is a duty of care
cannot be properly justified without observing that risky conduct usually creates a "reasonably
foreseeable" risk of harm to someone, and that such risk is sufficient to put the potential injurer
under an obligation of reasonable care. If no harm were reasonably foreseeable, insisting on the
exercise of care would be unreasonable. Why should anyone moderate the pursuit of their own
ends in the name of the security of other people when their conduct poses no discernible threat to
the security of anyone else?
35. This is not a critique of strict liability. Strict liability puts actors on notice that they will
be held accountable for harms properly charged to their activities, even if they should not have
prevented those harms. Strict liability for unforeseeable harms presents parallel problems to
negligence liability for unforeseeable harm. In the one case, the problem is being asked to
prevent harm one could not anticipate; in the other, the problem is being asked to bear financial
responsibility for harm one could not anticipate-but strict liability itself is not objectionable
because it holds actors responsible for harms that they should not have prevented. It may be
worth noting that negligence liability for unforeseeable harms is not likely to result in greater
precaution, as the risks are, in fact, unforeseeable. Thus, to the extent that negligence law is
intended to induce actors to take precautions to prevent harm to others, liability for unforeseeable
risks is not an appealing strategy.
36. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to
Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other "Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 329 (2006) [hereinafter Shielding
Duty].
37. Id. at 335-36.
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the issuance of relatively broad categorical rulings, the law would
move in the direction that [we] believe it should go."38 Third, they
argue that our "call for tighter boundary patrols"39 to keep contract
and property from swallowing tort is not "in the end actually
responsive to the doctrinal developments [we] decry."40  Formal
tidiness among doctrinal domains is compatible, they point out, with
different substantive priorities. California courts might well
construct clearer boundaries by curbing tort and expanding
contract- by making explicit and coherent what is now merely
implicit and inchoate.
Goldberg and Zipursky are right to observe both that more
general rulings might well move the law in a direction that we would
not like, and that "tighter patrolling" of the boundaries between tort,
contract and property is perfectly consistent with a reconfiguration of
38. Id. at 336.
39. Id. at 337.
40. Id. They also argue that our advice "is not likely to be heeded." Id. They may well be
right about this, but-although we would be happy to be heeded by the current California
courts-we did not write our paper by first figuring out what advice the courts were most likely
to heed, and then producing that advice. We wrote our paper to explain what California courts
are doing wrong, and how their wrongful practice can be righted.
We do believe, however, that it would be politically feasible for our advice to be heeded.
We disagree, for example, with Goldberg and Zipursky's argument that when Ornelas v.
Randolph, 847 P.2d 560 (Cal. 1993), came before the court in 1993, abolishing the status
categories was no longer a politically "tolerable state of affairs" so that landowner duties had to
be reconfigured. See Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 353. In fact, the status categories were
abolished in Nevada in 1994. See Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935, 943 (Nev.
1994) ("A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of... compensation under the law
because he has come upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without
a business purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such
matters .... " (citing and quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1960),
superseded by statute, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.139 (1994)). As we point out in Abusing "Duty,"
the political opposition to abolishing status categories centers on the issue of permitting criminal
trespassers to recover for injuries suffered during the commission of crimes; maintaining this
narrow category of landowner immunity (based on the principle that criminals should not profit
from their wrongs) but otherwise recognizing a general duty owed to all seems both politically
feasible and consistent with our doctrinal approach. See Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 278
n.34.
Cardi and Green make a similar point in Duty Wars when they note that they "do not share
[our] optimism that keeping duty in its proper place will change the contours of tort liability. The
forces at work in the last generation of tort retrenchment are far too powerful to be tamed by
coherent doctrine." See Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 733. We agree. But, like Cardi and Green
themselves, we believe that insisting on "more coherence and less confusion in torts cases" will
contribute "to more transparency and less obfuscation in courts' analyses of the moral and policy-
based underpinnings of their decisions, and to the maintenance of the long-standing separation of
the roles of judge and jury." Id. Over time, moreover, criticizing a legal trend can contribute to
reversing that trend.
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the boundaries among these fields in ways that we would find
distasteful. A clearer, more categorical body of civil law might be
constructed so as to give contract and property more priority over
tort than they have at present, and we would probably not be
delighted by such a development. We would, however, applaud its
intellectual integrity.
Transparency, honesty and rigor are virtues in judicial decision
making. The developments that we criticize are made worse by their
intellectual dishonesty. At their simplest and worst, these
developments involve nothing more than using the doctrine of duty
to reach preferred outcomes in particular cases and disguising that
enterprise as the legitimate articulation of law. We would disagree
with a rigorous and coherent turn to the right, but its honesty and
rigor would at least be worthy of respect. If nothing else, a rigorous
and coherent turn to the right would be more likely to result in the
consistent application of legal principles-and in the clarification of
the issues at stake.
That said, we were not, of course, arguing for a more rigorous
and transparent turn to the right.4" But then our point about the
relative spheres of tort, property and contract was not essentially
formal either. In our view, the laws of torts, contract and property
embody fundamental commitments of value and substance. In its
accident law branch, the law of torts is preoccupied with the physical
integrity of the person, whereas the law of property is concerned with
dominion over and use of external objects, and the law of contract
with choosing the terms of our more formal interactions.42 Modern
contract law, in point of fact, is preoccupied with one particular form
of free interaction, namely, the pursuit of mutual advantage in the
marketplace. To give tort priority over both property-as the
revolution inaugurated by Rowland v. Christian43  does-and
contract-as the revolution inaugurated by MacPherson v. Buick
41. See Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 270-71.
42. There is also, we think, another difference between our view of the role of duty doctrine
and Goldberg and Zipursky's view. We believe that duty delineates the domain of negligence
law, carving out a particular space in relation to the domains of property, contract, and legally
unregulated conduct. Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 273-79. In our view, this role is
extremely important, if often underappreciated precisely because duty is usually taken for
granted. Goldberg and Zipursky say nothing about this role.
43. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1960).
1236
Summer 2008] PUTTING "DUTY" IN ITS PLACE
Motor Co." does-is to express the liberal ideal that the liberty and
integrity of the person is a more urgent interest than these competing
interests in unfettered dominion over external objects or unfettered
freedom of economic exchange.45 In contrast, to grant property and
contract priority over tort is to express the competing quasi-
libertarian ideal that the free use of external objects and freedom of
economic exchange trump the liberty and physical integrity of other
persons who might be harmed by the unchecked exercise of property
and contract rights.46 The libertarian tinge that Goldberg and
Zipursky see as a contingent feature of Kentucky Fried Chicken of
California, Inc. v. Superior Court ("KFC") strikes us as a defining
feature of the larger transformation toward which California's
44. lllN.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
45. Abstractly, the domain of contract is the domain of voluntary agreement, not the domain
of economic liberty (or laissez-faire capitalism). The contractual ideas at work in the secondary
assumption of risk decisions that we criticize, however, express a laissez-faire ideal of economic
liberty. Indeed, a number of the California decisions in this area involve situations where it was
quite questionable whether there was voluntary consent to run the risk at issue, and where the
guiding idea was not that the plaintiff chose to run the risk but that the market took care of
"compensation." This is a resuscitation of assumption of the risk as it existed prior to the passage
of the workers' compensation acts.
46. To be sure, this is not rigorous libertarianism. Philosophically rigorous libertarianism, as
we understand it, gives pride of place to property and contract rights at the expense of rights of
personal liberty, among other things. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974); Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal
View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (2002) (explaining how libertarians' concept of liberty as a kind
of property leads to their rejection of basic liberal institutions). Libertarian theorists of tort
usually prescribe strict liability for stranger accidents, and for contract to control the terms of the
legal relations among potential injurers and victims who are not strangers. One of the things that
contract then protects is the property entitlements that the parties bring to the bargaining table.
See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY (1980) (advancing a
libertarian theory of strict liability for accidents among strangers); RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 91-111 (1995); ROBERT NOZICK, Prohibition, Compensation
and Risk, in ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 54 (1974). Our argument is that a conservative
philosophy infused with some aspects of libertarianism is at work--one which inchoately
attempts to reverse the priorities between tort and contract, and tort and property in several
important domains. To be sure, the highly particular character of the rulings we criticize can
serve to reduce the courts' ability to fully implement this quasi-libertarian philosophy because
particularistic rulings tend not to construct general rules. To the extent that the two tendencies do
hang together, they do so both because the rulings are concentrated in certain legal domains, and
because they cut back on duties of care. To the extent that the decisions we criticize are
published California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions, they set a tone and encourage
trial courts to grant summary judgment motions for defendants on the ground that they owed "no
duty." Because the existence and extent of a duty is an issue for the court to be decided before a
case goes to the jury, expanding the domain of duty decisions by its nature moves the law in a
pro-defendant direction. A plaintiff who-prior to the expansion of duty's domain-needed only
to convince the jury of his or her claim now has to complete two separate tasks using the same
evidence: establishing the existence of a duty to a judge, and establishing a breach of the duty to a
jury. Defendants get two bites at the same apple.
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ongoing abuse of duty incoherently gestures.4 ' The substance of
political morality-not the form of legal reasoning-is the deep issue
at stake in these decisions.
We suspect that Goldberg and Zipursky's mistaking of moral
substance for legal form has its roots in the way that they frame the
jurisprudential issues at stake. Shielding Duty lays the lion's share of
the blame for the ills that afflict California tort law on the triumph of
an instrumentalist style of legal reasoning, a triumph that preceded
the developments we criticize by at least several decades.48 Shielding
Duty's prescription for restoring California tort law to good health
places a correspondingly great emphasis on restoring traditional
doctrine-the doctrine that existed before the California court of the
postwar years supposedly dissolved various "quaint" doctrines in an
acid bath of instrumentalism.49 In framing the jurisprudential issues
47. Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1997). See
Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 354-56. The libertarianism to which we object is also implicit
in Ornelas v. Randolph, 847 P.2d 560 (Cal. 1993), a case that Goldberg and Zipursky defend.
Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 353.
48. The importance that Goldberg and Zipursky assign to instrumentalism in their
explanation of what ails California law is evidenced by the fact that Shielding Duty begins by
explaining how California courts were infected by the disease during the heyday of California
progressivism in the middle of the twentieth century. See Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 329-
33. We agree that there is something to this story. See Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 325.
We also believe that what we call "pure" instrumentalism is at odds with the very idea of "duty as
genuine moral obligation." See infra pp. 119-121.
We do not believe, however, that the "instrumentalist" style of legal reasoning allegedly
practiced by the Traynor court explains as much as Goldberg and Zipursky appear to think it
does. For one thing, the Traynor court's instrumentalism was restrained. Instead of deciding
individual cases on instrumental grounds the Traynor court reconstructed the law of torts at a very
general level. For instance, rather than deciding the specific duties owed relating to lane changes
on freeways, the Traynor court announced a principle of strict liability applicable to all defects in
the manufacture of products for the market. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 169-
72 (1964). See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, in MAIN CURRENTS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 530 (1993); Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interdependence in
Twentieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor and Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1169 (1997).
In the same vein, Rowland v. Christian-the font of contemporary California duty
analysis-itself asserts that duty can usually be inferred from injury, except in very rare
circumstances. 443 P.2d at 564. This is a broad and categorical conception of duty.
Furthermore, the Traynor court-like most and perhaps all courts-invoked both instrumental
"policies" and non-instrumental "principles" in its decisions. Its strict products liability
jurisprudence, for example, characteristically invokes two policies ("loss-prevention" or
deterrence, and "loss-spreading" or insurance) and one principle (the principle of commutative
justice: that those who benefit from a risk ought to bear its burdens as well). See Alan Calnan, A
Consumer-Use Approach to Products Liability, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 755, 760-66 (2003)
(discussing Traynor's justifications). To our eyes, the Traynor court looks no more
instrumentalist than many American courts.
49. See Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 350-61.
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in this way, Goldberg and Zipursky set up a choice between
instrumentalism and formalism. Implicitly or explicitly, scholarship
of the sort we engaged in expresses a jurisprudence, and if-in
betrayal of our home state-we are not instrumentalists, we must
necessarily be formalists. Our emphasis on the contrasts between
and priorities among tort, property and contract must therefore
involve nothing more than an attachment to formal architectural
tidiness.
We agree that the use of duty by contemporary California courts
exhibits faults that are identified with unprincipled, result-oriented
judicial decision making. At its simplest and worst, the California
courts' abuse of duty involves little more than opportunistic
invocation of the doctrine's status as a matter of law as cover for
reaching liability-restrictive outcomes preferred by the courts. But
there are other tendencies at work, and what troubles us with these
tendencies does not have much to do with instrumentalism, desirable
or undesirable. In our view, legal rules have reasons behind them,
and those reasons are reasons of political morality. More generally,
common law legal fields tend-in a fragmentary and inchoate way-
to give institutional expression to principles and conceptions of
political morality. The task of courts, we suppose, is to put the best
face on the law that they articulate and apply, by making that law as
formally coherent and as morally compelling as they can. The
developments that we criticize in Abusing "Duty" express an
inchoate quasi-libertarianism and mark a retreat from a more humane
and just liberalism." The broad duty of care recognized by
twentieth-century tort law got something important right: the
physical integrity of the person is a more urgent interest than
unfettered dominion over real property and unrestricted freedom of
economic exchange. People do have rights and we ought to take
them seriously."
To summarize, when Goldberg and Zipursky "see no reason to
suppose that, were the California courts to aspire to the issuance of
relatively broad categorical rulings, the law would move in the
direction that [we] believe it should go"52 and argue that our "call for
50. Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 289-323 (describing and critiquing contemporary
developments in tort law).
51. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. Press 1978).
52. Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 336.
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tighter boundary patrols [to keep contract and property from
swallowing tort] is not ... in the end actually responsive to the
doctrinal developments [we] decry,"53 they are mistakenly treating
our arguments as essentially formal. Those arguments, however, are
substantive as well as formal. We fault excessive particularity
because this particularity embodies an illegitimate abuse of judicial
authority-and in two directions. On the one hand, excessively
particular decisions abdicate the judiciary's obligation to articulate
law; on the other hand, excessively particular decisions usurp the
jury's authority to apply the law to the facts and bring its shared
sense of reasonableness to bear on deciding whether the defendant's
conduct was faulty. Courts compound this usurpation of democratic
authority when they issue rulings of "no duty" in the teeth of
statutory schemes that plainly contemplate the presence of duties. In
these cases, their rulings usurp the legitimate authority of the
legislature. Finally, we fault the subordination of tort to property and
contract because this subordination grants lesser interests in the use
of things and the pursuit of mutual economic advantage priority over
our more fundamental interests in the liberty and integrity of our
persons.
Because we do not believe that our criticisms of California
courts are merely formal, we do believe that Goldberg and
Zipursky's first criticism of our objection to the excessive
particularity of California courts' duty rulings is the most important
criticism of our paper. We shall devote considerable attention to this
criticism, which claims that our objection "is severely underspecified
because [we] never explain the level of categorization that [we] have
in mind, nor the reasons favoring one level of categorization over
another."54
We also think, however, that a deeper disagreement concerning
the character of duty divides us from Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky, and shapes our respective views of just how general duty
decisions should be. That issue has to do with the "relationality" of
duty. "Relationality," in turn, is linked to the idea that duty is a
matter of genuine moral obligation.
Part I of this Article will therefore take up the general topic of
53. Id. at 337.
54. Id. at 335-36.
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duty as obligation and relation. We shall concur with Professors
Goldberg and Zipursky that duty is a matter of genuine moral
obligation, and a relational norm, and dissent by asserting that duty is
only weakly relational. Part II engages our fundamental
disagreement with Goldberg and Zipursky, challenging the strongly
relational conception of duty that they endorse. This strongly
relational conception mischaracterizes negligent wrongdoing by
personalizing duty and breach-presenting negligence as an affront
done this plaintiff by this defendant. Negligence is not personal in
the way that a slap in the face or a boot on the neck is. Negligence is
a more abstract wrong-a failure to show sufficient regard for an
indefinite plurality of unknown persons who might come to grief
from one's carelessness.
By personalizing duty and breach, a strongly relational
conception of duty distorts the distinct elements of a negligence
claim. It commingles existence of obligation with discharge of
obligation and extent of liability. By cutting duty loose from its
conventional moorings, a strongly relational conception of duty tends
to make duty the master concept of negligence law and a live issue in
every case. A richly relational conception of duty is therefore more
likely to foster than to curb the abuse of duty. Even more troubling,
personalizing duty frames the issues at stake in duty decisions in a
way that obscures the general role of the doctrine and the importance
of the great duty decisions of the twentieth century. Those decisions
rightly established the precedence of the physical integrity of the
person over the free use of real property and the unfettered pursuit of
mutual advantage in the marketplace. This important-but general-
truth vanishes from sight as our gaze is focused on richly describing
the relations between particular plaintiffs and particular defendants.
Parts III and IV of this Article return from tort theory to tort law,
and respond to the principal criticisms that Shielding Duty urges
against Abusing "Duty, "tackling primary assumption of risk and the
generality of duty doctrine. By revisiting two leading cases, Parts V
and VI illustrate how California courts are usurping the role of the
jury and determining duty without articulating law.
I. DUTY As OBLIGATION AND RELATION
In an important earlier piece, Goldberg and Zipursky describe
duty as "the set of obligations that matches, roughly, what citizens
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believe about the care they owe one another."55 The care that people
owe each other depends, in turn, on the relations between or among
them. We agree with Goldberg and Zipursky that the artificial legal
duty of reasonable care is an extension and specification of a natural
moral obligation to respect-or not to harm-other people and their
property. Indeed, it is this very linkage of morality and law that
makes jury adjudication such an integral and appropriate part of
negligence law. We do not think, though, that either the natural
moral obligation or the artificial legal one is relational in a strong
sense of that term. That is, we do not think that the existence of the
obligation to exercise reasonable care depends on the details of the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant.
In our view, the shared deep basis of both the moral and the
legal duty of reasonable care is our common vulnerability to physical
harm at one another's hands. That standing peril is alone sufficient
to insist that, so far as risks of serious physical injury are concerned,
"all persons have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from
being injured as the result of their conduct."56 We are reciprocally
responsible for exercising reasonable care to avoid inflicting physical
injury on one another because we are all equally and intrinsically
valuable and each of us has an urgent interest in the physical
integrity of our persons. Duty, in other words, is only minimally
relational. It is relational in the sense that it is owed by people and to
other people-by each of us to everyone else. But within the sphere
of duties that are owed to other people, duty in negligence law is
only minimally relational. In general, the only "relation" needed to
make our negative duty of reasonable care operative is the minimal
relation between persons established when one person's actions put
another person at reasonably foreseeable risk of physical injury.
Put otherwise, our disagreement with Goldberg and Zipursky is
this: We agree that duty in negligence law-unlike duty to God or
country-is relational in the sense that it is owed to others and not to
some impersonal value. But we disagree with the implication that
the relational character of duty invites, requires or entails inquiry into
the details of the relations between plaintiff and defendant. Duty in
55. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1733, 1744 (1998) [hereinafter The Moral of MacPherson], cited in Duty Wars, supra note
27, at 686 n.87.
56. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1997).
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negligence law is relational, but it is also general in both its
formulation and its operation. It is general in its formulation because
everyone owes everyone else the obligation to exercise reasonable
care not to endanger one another. It is general in its operation
because it protects persons by class and not by name; the duty of
reasonable care protects the class of those that reasonable foresight
shows to be put at risk by a potential injurer's careless conduct. A
driver, for instance, does not owe one duty of care to the hybrid
driver on his left and a different duty of care to the SUV driver on his
right.
A. Relational and Non-Relational Obligations
As a matter of dictionary definition, the word "duty" has several
different meanings. At its most abstract, it identifies an action or
constraint that is "required by moral obligation, demanded by
custom, or enjoined by feelings of rightness or fitness."57 Duty in
this sense is about obligation-as opposed, say, to self-interest. But
not all obligations are alike. Obligations are sometimes "abstract in
the highest sense (e.g., obedience to the dictates of conscience)"58
and sometimes "based on local and personal relations"59 in the way
that the mutual duties of parents and children are. "Duties" in this
second sense are not "owed" to abstract principles of morality, but to
other people. They are due to some and owed by others. Duties that
are due to some and owed by others are "relational."
There are two distinct ideas involved in this dictionary definition
of duty. One is the idea of obligation; the other is the distinction
between relational and non-relational duties. Goldberg and Zipursky
emphasize both of these aspects of duty.6" Their animus against
instrumentalism, for instance, appears in its best light when the issue
on the table is the obligatory character of "duty."'" Pure
instrumentalism fails to take rights seriously and so is at odds with
the idea of duty as obligation. Pure instrumentalism takes tort law to
57. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 705 (3d ed. 1968).
58. Duty, Classic Encyclopedia Based on the 11 th Edition of the Enclyclopedia Britannica,
http://l91 encyclopedia.org/Duty (last modified Sept. 3, 2006).
59. Id.
60. The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55, at 1749.
61. Id. at 1826. Cf JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 34-36, n. 19 (arguing
that the category of duty "does not work in the law and economics account of tort law").
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be a tool for the promotion of an independently desirable end-
welfare cashed out as wealth in the most familiar version of such
instrumentalism 62-and conceives of all tort doctrines simply as tools
for promoting this end. On such a view, duty doctrine is just another
device for balancing the costs and benefits of accidents in a way that
minimizes the (social) costs and maximizes the (social) benefits of
accidents and their prevention. Duty is not a matter of what we owe
to other people; it is, instead, a device for putting scarce resources to
their highest use.63
We agree with Goldberg and Zipursky both that duty is a matter
of genuine moral obligation and that a purely instrumental
conception of tort law denies the obligatory character of "duty."
People have an urgent interest in the physical integrity of their
person, and that interest is sufficient to justify a right to physical
integrity. That right, in turn, places limits on the way that people can
treat one another and so grounds the duty of reasonable care. A
purely instrumental view-one which, say, seeks to maximize
wealth as a surrogate for maximizing welfare-denies the intrinsic
value of persons. This view denies that human beings have rights to
the physical integrity of their persons and hence are owed duties of
reasonable care. It sees persons simply as so many sites where
welfare might be located. "Welfare" is the touchstone of value and
62. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). For
Goldberg and Zipursky, Prosser and his duty-skepticism is the principal target. See The Moral of
MacPherson, supra note 55, at 1756-66, discussed in Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 325 n.244
and the sources cited therein.
63. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972). Posner
states:
[B]ecause we do not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence has
inescapable overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper
alternative to the accident. Conversely, there is no moral indignation in the case in
which the cost of prevention would have exceeded the cost of the accident. Where the
measures necessary to avert the accident would have consumed excessive resources,
there is no occasion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them.
Id. For specific application of the economic conception of negligence law to duty doctrine, see
Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501 (2006).
Hylton argues that duty rules serve several functions, but that an important one is "encourag[ing]
or subsidiz[ing] activities that carry substantial external benefits." Id. at 1502. Duty is thus a
device for optimizing social welfare for optimizing social costs and social benefits. "No duty"
rulings are appropriate when an activity's positive externalities "are considerably in excess of" its
negative externalities. Id. at 1505. "Duty" is thus not a matter of obligation to other people;
instead, it is a matter of our obligation to promote the general good, conceived in economic terms.
Before Hylton, duty seems to have been overlooked by legal economists writing on tort. See
Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 43 n. 150.
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duty is an instrument for maximizing overall welfare. In our view
pure instrumentalism is deeply mistaken and quite incapable of
explaining "duty." For the law of negligence, persons are the
principal object of moral concern. Duty is grounded in respect for
their intrinsic value and the urgency of their interest in physical
integrity.
We also agree with a larger point, which we take to inform
Goldberg and Zipursky's animus against instrumentalism. Tort law
is a practice of holding persons-natural and artificial-responsible
for harm done, and the attitudes and conceptions that animate tort
express a stance towards responsibility that a direct and exclusive
instrumentalism cannot capture. The facts that future accidents
would be minimized and past losses dispersed in a desirable way if
the defendant were held liable in a particular case do not speak to
whether or not the injury at hand was wrongly inflicted. This is true
no matter how worthy accident minimization and loss-dispersion
may be as ends.6' Tort has its roots in moral sentiments that direct
instrumentalism can neither explain nor justify, namely, the
resentment people feel at mistreatment by others, and the demand for
reparation to which that resentment gives rise.65 There is, here, a
latent distinction between crime and tort. Everyone may be in a
position to criticize seriously wrongful conduct as something that
warrants disapproval and punishment. Criminal law responds to and
expresses this truth. But only some people can resent wrongful
conduct and demand its redress. These are the people who are
wronged by that conduct; they alone have standing to claim that the
wrong done them be made right by those who have done them
wrong. Tort law is concerned with this class of persons and, indeed,
is about this aspect of wrongdoing. Goldberg and Zipursky are right
64. Our point here is about the direct application of instrumental arguments to specific cases.
Instrumental concerns with minimizing the combined costs of accidents and their prevention
might, in rule utilitarian fashion, server to justify recognizing various duties of care. Once such
duties were recognized, failure to comply with them might provide a reason of the right kind,
justifying the imposition of liability. Indirect instrumentalism is not necessarily vulnerable to the
objection we urge against direct instrumentalism. This distinction bears on our appraisal of
California law. We find the instrumentalism of Rowland v. Christian and the Traynor court more
generally to be essentially indirect.
65. The classic statement of the importance of such "reactive attitudes" as resentment and of
instruientalism's inability to account for these attitudes is P.F. STRAWSON, Freedom and
Resentment, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT AND ACTION 71 (1968). The same
deep fact is marked by Rousseau's oft-quoted observation: "The nature of things does not madden
us, only ill will does." 4 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 320 (Bernard Gagnebin trans., 1969).
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to insist on this truth. Where they go wrong (in our view) is in taking
this truth about tort to require a thickly relational conception of
"duty." It would be better to say that the elements of a negligence
claim taken as a unified whole ought to cohere with the overarching
truth about the role of tort law.
Our agreement with Goldberg and Zipursky that legal obligation
tracks moral obligation and that thoroughgoing instrumentalism is
incompatible with the genuinely obligatory character of duty is,
however, subject to important qualifications. The legal obligation of
reasonable care is an artificial articulation of a preexisting natural
duty, but it can also be articulated in ways that conflict with and
undermine our moral obligations. Affirmative duty doctrine in tort,
for example, does not match our moral intuitions. Indeed,
affirmative duty doctrine affronts our moral sensibilities by refusing
to recognize legal obligations in circumstances where we are
generally thought to have moral obligations.66  Perhaps more
importantly, we think that instrumental considerations do figure in
negligence law and properly so in many circumstances. Instrumental
policies should be framed and limited by principles of justice and
right, but they should not be banished from the law. Instrumental
"policy" is as much a part of tort law as non-instrumental
"principle."
B. Putting Policy in its Place
The proper place of instrumental reasons in negligence law is a
complex topic, and we can only touch on it here. For now it may
suffice to observe that any conception of negligence law has to be
concerned with the efficacy of its own obligations, which brings
considerations of deterrence into play. Fixing the extent of liability
for harm wrongly inflicted may properly involve taking into account
the deterrent effect of recognizing or refusing to recognize liability
66. Courts themselves have been known to make this point. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282-83 (Kan. 1903). Following Professor Stapleton, Cardi and Green also
note that affirmative duty doctrine does not track our ordinary sense of moral obligation. See
Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky's Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1529, 1556 (2006) ("But tort law's finely articulated incidence of obligations does not
simply track moral duty, a point illustrated by the absence of a duty to attempt an easy rescue of a
helpless stranger."); see also Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 42 n.148. There may, of course, be
good reasons why negligence law should depart from our ordinary sense of moral obligation, and
those reasons may themselves be moral. It may be, for instance, that some moral obligations may
not justly be enforced by law. Our point is simply that the law and ordinary morality do diverge.
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for some class of injuries. This concern that tort obligations be
honored in fact-and that tort law itself provide incentives for
compliance with its commands-is indeed, central to liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress as we understand it.67 More
generally, instrumental arguments are salient in the domain of
proximate cause, and rightly so.68 At the margin, it is perfectly
sensible to fix the scope of liability for harm wrongly done, in part,
by asking about how different delineations of the domain of liability
will affect the incidence of wrongful (and rightful) conduct. The
right to the physical integrity of one's person does not by itself
determine the scope of liability for breach of the duty of due care.
The outer perimeters of liability ought to be determined in part by
asking instrumental questions because any system of rights ought to
be concerned with its own efficacy. Negligence law therefore has
good reason both to ask how much liability is necessary to induce
potential injurers to exercise reasonable care and to reverse that
question and ask at what point liability becomes so burdensome that
it impairs the right to impose reasonable risks. Other kinds of
reasons may also figure in judgments about the proper scope of
liability. We may, for example, reasonably believe that liability
should bear some relationship to culpability.69 That consideration
sounds neither in principled respect for individual right nor in
instrumental concern with deterrent efficacy. It sounds in retributive
justice. Just as we may want "the punishment to fit the crime" so,
too, when we are fixing the boundaries of liability in tort, we may
believe that the scope of responsibility should not be
disproportionate to the wrong done.
If we were, rashly, to venture a general thesis about the
respective roles of non-instrumental principle and instrumental
policy in negligence law we would not say that tort law is all
principle and no policy, but that policy is subordinate to principle.
The rights that people have and the obligations that those rights
entail constrain the domain of permissible policy argument. This
priority of moral principle and individual right over instrumental
policy and the general good expresses the inviolability of persons,
67. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (explaining that
courts must "define an orbit of duty that places controllable limits on liability").
69. See infra notes 104-106 and 115-120 and accompanying text.
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preventing the sacrifice of their fundamental interests in the pursuit
of the general welfare. For example,7" when risks of death and
devastating harm are at stake, those at risk may reasonably object to
taking only efficient or cost-justified risk precautions against such
risks. Cost-justified precaution expresses the morality of the market
and trades goods off against each other in a way that denies that
some goods-like life-are more valuable than others-like
convenience or fine wine. When everything is given a price,
everything is fungible with everything else at some ratio of
exchange. Yet life is especially valuable and its protection especially
urgent. Morally acceptable principles for trading life off against
other goods must take into account the special value of life and the
special urgency of protecting against death and devastating injury.
Taking the inviolability of persons seriously requires that some
be put at significant risk of death or devastation only when others
stand to lose something of comparable value if that risk is reduced to
insignificance. Not everything is morally comparable to death and
devastating injury, in part because what counts morally is not the
total sum of burden and benefit but the actual distribution of burdens
and benefits among affected persons. When significant risks of
physical injury ripen into death and incurable disease, the benefits of
going beyond the cost-justified level of precaution are measured in
terms of lives saved and incurable diseases avoided. To those who
reap them, these are invaluable benefits. The distributed costs of
going beyond the cost-justified point of precaution, by contrast, may
well be small-perhaps very small-losses to large numbers of
people. Sacrificing an urgent interest-the interest in avoiding
premature death or devastating injury-for the sake of trivial gains to
others cannot be justified to those whose urgent interests are
sacrificed. They may fairly complain that their fundamental interests
are being sacrificed to the general good, in the guise of wealth and
welfare maximization. It is only fair to ask some people to bear a
significant risk of devastating injury when the burden of eliminating
that risk is comparable to the burden of bearing it.
Cost-benefit analysis ignores this precept of fairness. It treats all
costs and all benefits as interests that are fungible at some ratio of
70. The following two and a half paragraphs summarize the argument of Gregory C.
Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REv. 159 (2005).
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exchange and aggregates costs and benefits across persons. Cost-
benefit analysis supposes that loss of life or health by some can
always be offset by increase in wealth to others, no matter how
trivial the effect of that increased wealth may be in the lives of those
who benefit from it. Taking the inviolability of persons seriously
may therefore require pressing precaution beyond the point of cost-
justification and either eliminating "significant" risks of devastating
injury or reducing them to the extent that such reduction is
"feasible." Matters are quite different when serious physical injury
is tortiously risked but, fortuitously, only emotional distress or pure
economic loss is inflicted. Here, the question is not whether the
urgent interests of some should be sacrificed to the trivial interests of
others. Here, the question is what should be done when physical
injury is tortiously risked and nonphysical injury is instead inflicted.
Here we may quite properly ask if the imposition of liability for pure
emotional or economic loss is advisable in part as an incentive to
induce other potential injurers to exercise appropriate care. That, of
course, is an instrumental question.
Subject to this constraint, we regard the invocation of
instrumental policies as generally unobjectionable. 7 Tort theory
ought to begin within and return to the practice of tort law, and
instrumental reasoning figures prominently in the practice and
rhetoric of tort law.72 This large topic, however, is also a subject for
another day and a different paper. We shall only return to it briefly
later in this Article when we are discussing duty in contradistinction
to proximate cause.
II. Is DUTY PERSONAL?
Because we agree that negative duty in negligence law is
fundamentally and importantly a matter of genuine moral obligation,
71. For some general discussion, see Gregory C. Keating, Personal Inviolability and
"Private Law, " 1 J. TORT L., June 2007, http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/iss2/art4. For a case
taking this view, see Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir.
1968).
72. Speaking generally, we agree with Cardi and Green and the scholars they cite who
emphasize the plurality of values relevant to tort. Compare Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 42
n.148 (citing to and quoting writings by Calabresi, Gary Schwartz, and Jane Stapleton, among
others), with Kenneth W. Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 698, 700,
737-38 (1996) (arguing against Ernest Weinrib's concept of formal coherence as the master key
to private law and in favor of a conception of tort law which "emphasizes the rights-based nature
of private law, [but] permits pluralistic grounds or justifications for the scope of rights").
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our principal quarrel with Goldberg and Zipursky lies elsewhere. As
we have said, they believe that duty is strongly relational, whereas
we think that duty is only weakly relational. We believe, moreover,
that treating duty as strongly relational tends to corrode the
generality of duty doctrine. When duty judgments are made more
particular, the line between judgments of duty and judgments of
liability "all things considered" erodes.73 By expanding the domain
of "law" and blurring the line between law articulation and law
application, this particularizing of duty also erodes the line between
judge and jury. A strongly relational conception of duty makes it a
live issue long after an obligation of reasonable care is conceded.
Once duty is turned loose in this way it is an invitation for judges to
inquire into the details of plaintiffs' relations with defendants, and a
license for judges to take cases away from juries whenever the
judges' own conviction is that the defendant is not-all things
considered-responsible for the plaintiff s injury.
Let us begin by recalling our common ground with Goldberg
and Zipursky. Relational duties are duties that are owed to other
people; they prescribe or prohibit various ways of treating other
people. Relational negative duties-and the general duty of care is
largely negative 74 -prohibit mistreating or wronging others. A duty
not to litter on public streets is not essentially relational, whereas a
duty of reasonable care is. Littering may despoil our landscape and
inflict injury on our environment, but littering is not primarily a
wrong done to other people.75 Negligent conduct mistreats other
people and so expresses insufficient concern for their safety and
security. The general duty of reasonable care is thus a relational,
negative duty.
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky move, however, from the
instructive insight that duties of care are owed by some people to
other people to the unpersuasive conclusion that because the concept
of duty is relational in this abstract sense, wrongdoing in negligence
73. We are thus in agreement with Cardi and Green when they write "a relational approach
necessarily collapses the duty analysis into a liability analysis, distorting the established territory
of the separate elements of a negligence claim." Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 713-14..
74. See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55, at 1810. But the general duty of care is
not entirely negative. There is more than a whiff of the affirmative to the injunction that we must
stand vigilantly on guard not to carelessly trample others.
75. See Benjamin Zipursky & Arthur Ripstein, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts,
in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 218 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
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must be conceived of as personal-as a matter of a wrong done to
this particular plaintiff by this particular defendant.76 Duty and
breach are not just relational in the general sense that they involve
obligations that some people owe to other people; they are relational
in the far more specific sense of involving obligations that run from
this named defendant to this named plaintiff." "[N]egligence is a
relation between particular individuals."78 The negligent conduct of
the Long Island Railroad's servants-pulling out of the station while
one guard on the train held its moving doors open and yanked two
would-be passengers aboard the train as another guard on the
platform shoved those passengers on 79 -may be a wrong, Cardozo
asserts, only in relation to the passenger holding the unmarked
package of explosives, or even only in relation to the package itself.8"
But a wrong to other people or other interests will not sustain the
negligence claim of a plaintiff who simply happens to be injured by
that wrongdoing.8' Rather, the plaintiff "must show [] 'a wrong' to
76. See Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 340; The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55, at
1832-39 (describing the "relational duty in the common law of negligence").
77. See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55, at 1832. Goldberg and Zipursky write:
"Most famously in Palsgraf, but consistently throughout his negligence jurisprudence, Cardozo
insisted that the duty to act reasonably is not a duty owed to the world at large, but a duty owed to
the plaintiff in particular." Id. at 1814 (emphasis added). They further explain that "[t]he duty
question in a negligence case is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to use a
particular level of care to avoid the sort of injury the plaintiff suffered." Id. at 1828. Moreover,
the authors write "[iln a broad range of negligence cases, courts focus specifically on whether a
defendant who was concededly negligent in some respect breached a duty of care to the plaintiff."
Id. at 1832 (emphasis added).
78. Arthur L. Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J.
449, 452 (1930) (summarizing Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion) (emphasis added). This personalized
view of negligent wrongdoing is not peculiar to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky. Ernest
Weinrib's corrective justice theory, which holds that the plaintiff may recover from the defendant
only if the plaintiff suffers the very wrong that the defendant inflicts, also embraces a personal
conception of negligent wrongdoing. For Weinrib, too, Cardozo's Palsgraf opiion is the world
in a grain of sand. ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, 147, 160 (1995) [hereinafter,
WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW]. Indeed, Weinrib sometimes writes as if his entire conception of tort
law stands or falls with Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of
Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 803 (2001).
79. Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). The negligence is not easy
to divine from Cardozo's statement of the facts but was clearly stated in the intermediate
appellate court opinion. See the editing of the case in ROBERT E. KEETON, ET AL., TORT AND
ACCIDENT LAW 617 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the characterization of the negligence in the
Appellate Division). The fact that Cardozo continually casts doubt on the existence of any
negligence towards anyone has contributed to the confusion surrounding his opinion. See Petition
of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1964).
80. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99-100.
81. Id. at 99.
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herself; i.e., a violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong to
some one else. 82 Mrs. Palsgraf must be able to claim that the Long
Island Railroad's breach was a personal affront to her, a careless
disregard of her safety.83
For Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, Palsgraf is relational
duty incarnate. Their reading of it will therefore pay back the trouble
of a bit more unpacking. That reading begins by conceding that the
Long Island Railroad owed every one of its passengers-including
Mrs. Palsgraf-a duty of care.84 This concession, however, does not
dispose of duty as an issue in the case. Duty lingers on, so that the
analysis of breach returns us to the seemingly settled question of
duty. There must be a nexus between duty and breach, and that
nexus is absent in Palsgraf The conduct of the Railroad's
employees in shoving and yanking the nameless passengers onto the
moving train was negligent toward those passengers and their
property but not toward Mrs. Palsgraf.85 She was standing too far
away from the scene of the carelessness for that carelessness to count
82. Id. at 100.
83. Id. at 99.
84. See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55, at 1819-20. We agree that duty in its
ordinary sense is unproblematically present in Palsgraf
85. See John C.P. Goldberg, Duty and the Structure of Negligence, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 149, 151 (2000). Goldberg writes:
[D]uty refers at times to what might be called a nexus or 'proper plaintiff' requirement.
When a plaintiff stands up in court, the plaintiff has to show that some duty owed to
the plaintiff or persons like the plaintiff has been breached. It is not enough for a
plaintiff to say there has been a breach of a duty owed to somebody out there and I
have been injured by that breach. That was Mrs. Palsgraf's claim. You, the railroad,
breached a duty to that guy over there when you pushed him, and by the way, I got
injured. As Cardozo explained, however, that is not a breach of a duty owed to Mrs.
Palsgraf.... Pushing someone over there carrying a nondescript package is not a
breach of a duty owed to someone standing over here. It is not negligent as to that
someone.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also ERNEST WEINRIB, The Disintegration of Duty, in
EXPLORING TORT LAW 143, 155 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) ("In Palsgraf the defendant
arguably created an unreasonable risk to the third-party's package but was being sued for
wrongful infringement of the plaintiff's right to bodily integrity."); WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW,
supra note 78, at 147, 158-60 ("The duty issue focuses on the link between the defendant's
negligence and the person injured .... By endangering the property of the pushed passenger, the
act of the defendant's employee fell below the standard of care .... The defendant's negligence
was to the package's owner, the harm done to [Mrs. Palsgraf] was the result of a wrong to
someone else."); cf RIPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 66 ("The court held that the railway was, at most,
negligent in its treatment of the unidentified passenger. By pushing him, they failed to show
appropriate care for his parcel."). But see infra note 94, (citing authority for the proposition that
foreseeability of plaintiff is a proximate cause issue).
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as breach of a duty of care owed to her. 6
On this account, duty is no longer simply the first element of
plaintiffs case and a nonissue almost all of the time; it is now a
diffuse and protean concept that pervades the law of negligence. It
bleeds into breach and, indeed, into the question of liability all things
considered. Proximate cause disappears as a distinct issue in
Palsgraf, swallowed up by the intersection of duty and a duty
inflected inquiry into breach. An idiosyncratic detail of the case-
the distance that Mrs. Palsgraf just happened to be standing from the
scene of the shoving-supports a judicial determination of "no
duty."87  When circumstances this particular suffice to support a
ruling of "no duty," duty doctrine has been transformed into a
plenary power to dispose of any individual case. Duty doctrine so
conceived places in the hands of judges the standing power to assert
that this defendant did not breach a duty owed to this plaintiff on
these facts.88 Once summoned, this genie will not go gently back
into its bottle.
A. Duty and Proximate Cause in Palsgraf
Contrary to Goldberg and Zipursky, we regard Cardozo's
86. See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55, at 1819-20. This claim that, as a matter
of law, no duty of care owed Mrs. Palsgraf was breached depends in part on the idea of a "duty-
breach" nexus, but it also depends on the factual claim that harm to Mrs. Palsgraf from the
railroad's negligence was not foreseeable. This is far from clear. Harm to passengers on the
platform is clearly foreseeable. In Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964),
Judge Friendly writes:
Certainly there is no general principle that a railroad owes no duty to persons on station
platforms not in immediate proximity to the tracks, as would have been quickly
demonstrated if Mrs. Palsgraf had been injured by the fall of improperly loaded objects
from a passing train ... Neither is there any principle that railroad guards who jostle a
package-carrying passenger owe a duty only to him; if the package had contained
bottles, the Long Island would surely have been liable for injury caused to close
bystanders by flying glass or spurting liquid.
Id. at 721. The foreseeability of harm to Mrs. Palsgraf thus depends on just where she was
standing and just how she was injured (whether by the explosion itself or by the ensuing panic).
But neither of these facts has ever been settled. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN
REPUTATION 34-35, 39 (1990); see also WILLIAM H. MANZ, THE PALSGRAF CASE 1-4 (2005).
Without knowing where Mrs. Palsgraf was standing or how she came to be injured it seems to us
that neither Cardozo nor any of the rest of us are in a position to say that it was impossible to
foresee any harm to Mrs. Palsgraf.
87. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
88. But see Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 721, 715-18 (distinguishing between
"circumstantial" and "substantive" relationality and noting the importance of "circumstantial"
relationality to Goldberg and Zipursky's understanding of duty analysis).
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celebrated duty rhetoric in Palsgraf as a mistake, precisely because it
personalizes "duty." Plaintiffs bringing negligence claims sue
neither on the basis of wrongs to others nor on the basis of wrongs
personal to themselves. They sue on the basis of the unique injuries
negligently inflicted upon them, and usually they must establish all
of the elements of completed wrong to recover, but they are treated
negligently as members of the class of persons foreseeably
endangered by defendant's negligence. Negligent risk imposition is
not an affront to a particular person in the way that a punch in the
nose or a knife in the back is. 89
Duty, moreover, is not the master concept of modem negligence
law. Duty addresses the existence of obligation in tort and-when
risk of physical harm is at issue-duty ordinarily exists. When it
does exist, it is a highly general legal obligation. The modem
negligence duty of reasonable care that took shape with the birth of
modem tort law late in the nineteenth century9" is general in both its
operation and its basis.9 It is unfettered from special statuses and
89. It helps here to distinguish between primary and secondary rights and duties and between
"rights in personam" and "rights in rem." In negligence law, primary rights and duties have to do
with conduct. The duty to exercise reasonable care is primary, as is the correlative right to have
such care exercised. Secondary rights and duties have to do with redress. They arise out of the
infliction of injury through breach of the primary obligation to exercise reasonable care. These
secondary rights to redress are in personam rights. They are held by and against determinate
persons-by one person against another for the unique injuries that the former has suffered at the
hands of the latter. Primary rights to reasonable care, by contrast, are "in rem" rights, in
Hohfeld's sense. They apply to an indefinite number of legal relations. Primary rights to
reasonable care are held by everyone and primary duties of reasonable care are owed to everyone.
See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, 81-86 (1978). A right to
redress for negligently inflicted harm is thus personal, whereas the right to have reasonable care
exercised for one's protection is not.
90. See Tom Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1225, 1256-57, 1266-68 (2001)
(explaining how negligence emerged during the late nineteenth century as an independent tort
organized around a general duty of reasonable care). Oliver Wendell Holmes' proclamation that
tort law imposes a duty "of all the world to all the world" is at the intellectual center of this
emergence of negligence as an independent tort. See The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REv. 652,
660 (1873) (unsigned article universally attributed to Oliver Holmes).
91. Duty is the master concept of late nineteenth century negligence law because the
recognition of a general duty of care constitutes negligence as an independent, freestanding cause
of action. See Percy Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 41, 49-50
(1934). Before negligence is recognized as a freestanding tort focused on defendant's conduct, it
is merely a mode in which a number of torts might be committed. Id. Negligence as "mode" has
to do with "inadvertence" as a mental state, in contrast to intention (e.g., with "negligent"
misrepresentation as opposed to "intentional" misrepresentation). Once negligence is established
as a freestanding tort, duty recedes into the background. Id. at 49-50. The freestanding tort takes
accidental physical injury to be its principal domain, and when risk of accidental physical injury
is at issue, duty can usually be taken for granted as the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) says and as scholars have long noted.
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predicated on our common status as human beings. It is owed by
everyone to everyone else and it is ordinarily triggered simply by
acting in a way that poses a "reasonably foreseeable" risk of harm to
anyone at all. Breach, in turn, is an inquiry into whether a defendant
exercised reasonable care in light of all of the foreseeable risks at
hand. When the harm that materializes is unexpected-when it is not
the harm that we had in mind when we imposed the duty-the
question is one of proximate cause, not duty. When the harm that
materializes is unexpected, the question posed is about the extent of
liability, not the existence of obligation. Great as it is, Cardozo's
Palsgraf opinion leads us astray by splintering duty into an indefinite
and ill-defined set of "duties." Once duty is shredded and set loose
in this way, the lines dividing duty, breach and proximate cause
become blurred and the division of labor in negligence law becomes
fouled.
1. Disaggregating Duty
Perhaps the most salient feature of Cardozo's duty analysis in
Palsgraf is his suggestion that we must distinguish among the
persons jeopardized by a careless act and disaggregate the diverse
interests that are jeopardized. He writes:
The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its
relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its
relation to the plaintiff, standing far away .... [I]f there was
a wrong to [the passenger carrying the package] at all,
which may very well be doubted[,] it was a wrong to a
property interest only, the safety of his package.... There
is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn
according to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as
where conduct negligent in that it threatens an insignificant
invasion of an interest in property results in an
unforeseeable invasion of an interest of another order, as,
See id.
Characteristically, perhaps, Holmes' position with respect to the "relationality" of duty is
ambiguous. On the one hand, his famous remark is naturally read as a statement of minimally
relational duty a claim that everyone owes to everyone else a duty of reasonable care. On the
other hand, Holmes' general view of tort law is naturally read as loosely utilitarian and so is
usually thought to deny that tort is a matter of genuine moral obligation to other people. For a
discussion of the way in which modem economic analysis denies that tort is a matter of genuine
moral obligation, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may
be necessary. We do not go into the question now.92
The first passage disaggregates the duties owed to different
people; the second contemplates disaggregating the duties owed to
diverse kinds of interests. Both moves are unattractive and, taken
literally, unworkable. Writing in 1930, Arthur Goodhart shuddered
at "the terrifying prospect of a whole new series of cases in which it
will be necessary to consider whether or not a person has the same
interest in his foot and his eye, in his two adjoining houses, in his
ship and the cargo which it carries."93
More importantly, potential injurers usually cannot treat the
different people and diverse interests endangered by their conduct in
different ways. Palsgraf itself illustrates the point. The Long Island
Railroad and its agents could act in only one of a small number of
mutually exclusive ways-they could assist, restrain or ignore the
passengers running for the train, and the train could pull out of the
station with its doors open or with its doors closed. The guards could
not treat the passengers in one way (assist their efforts to board the
train), their package in a different way (keep it safe on the platform),
and third parties (each and every person whose security and property
might be jeopardized if the boarding of a moving train came to a bad
end) in an indefinite number of still different ways. The guards
could not catalog the interests of each and every person in the
vicinity and determine what duty might be owed to each person-
much less each of their interests-and then proceed with courses of
conduct appropriate to each distinct person or interest. Nor, for that
matter, could they continuously calibrate their conduct to Mrs.
Palsgraf's particular situation-ignoring her at some moments,
attending to her at others-as she moved about the platform. The
problem is not simply that time is scarce and calibration is time
consuming. The problem is that the railroad's servants had to make
a judgment about the overall risks of several competing courses of
action and choose one.
92. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 99-101.
93. Goodhart, supra note 78, at 467. To be sure, Goodhart's foreboding has not come to
pass. One would be hard pressed even tofind negligence cases that distinguish among diverse
interests and correlative duties in the manner prescribed by Palsgraf If Goodhart has failed as a
prophet, however, the failure of the practice that Palsgraf prefigures to take hold is at least some
evidence that the practice is, as Goodhart thought, unworkable.
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Because the Long Island Railroad and its agents could not
calibrate their care to the particular circumstances of distinct persons
and diverse interests, so too they could not mistreat these persons and
interests in different ways. If the railroad's actions were faulty-and
the jury found that they were-they were faulty with respect to all
those put at reasonably foreseeable risk of physical harm. If it was
negligent to start the train with its doors still open and to shove and
yank the anonymous passengers onto the moving train, it was
negligent with respect to the passengers, their package, and
bystanders on the platform alike. The negligent wrongdoing was the
same in all of these cases. If no harm to Mrs. Palsgraf was
foreseeable, the reason to deny her recovery sounds in proximate
cause-the point is that she was outside the scope of the risk that
made the railroad's conduct negligent. Its liability does not extend to
her injury. If the railroad cannot calibrate its care to Mrs. Palsgraf's
precise position, Mrs. Palsgraf can position herself outside the zone
of risk created by the railroad's careless actions.94
Cardozo's soaring rhetoric in Palsgraf thus errs by
disaggregating duty. Duty doctrine articulates standards of care and
standards of care "bind ... prospectively on members of two general
classes of legal subjects."95  They obligate potential injurers to
respect the safety of all those endangered by their conduct. In
determining whether a duty of care exists we do not disassemble the
interests of those who might be affected by the conduct at issue and
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6, reporters' notes
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("Modem scholars tend to classify the issue of foreseeable
plaintiff under the general heading of proximate cause, as does this Restatement in Chapter 6.").
See generally Duty Wars, supra note 27, at 51 n.181 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) and other authority in
support of this proposition). If Mrs. Palsgraf was standing outside the zone of risk created by the
Railroad's negligence, on a "zone of the risk" conception of proximate cause it is correct to say
that Mrs. Palsgraf's right to reasonable care was not violated. She can show duty, breach, cause-
in-fact, and injury-but not proximate cause. We are not, ourselves, partial to this position
because there is enduring uncertainty as to just where on the platform Mrs. Palsgraf was standing.
See supra note 86.
Alternatively, one might take the view that the Railroad's negligence was not the
proximate cause of Mrs. Palsgraf's injury on the ground that the risk of explosion was
unforeseeable. On this view, when we ask why the Railroad's actions were negligent, we do not
cite, in our answer, the chance of the package exploding. As we explain in the text accompanying
note 91, we are partial to this view of the case. Note on this view, too, there is no completed
wrong to Mrs. Palsgraf.
95. Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Corrective Justice, 22 L. & PHIL., 21, 50 (2002)
(emphasis added).
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examine each interest separately to determine if the risk of harm to
that interest justifies imposition of an obligation of care. Indeed, we
do the exact opposite-we consider all the endangered persons and
interests. It is similarly mistaken to collapse the inquiries into duty
and breach and to blur the distinction between these and proximate
cause. Duty, breach and proximate cause are distinct elements of a
negligence claim. Duty asks about the existence of obligation; it
looks to the universe of reasonably foreseeable risks of injury and
asks if they justify the exercise of care. Breach asks whether the
defendant in fact exercised reasonable care or took reasonable
precaution, in light of all of the foreseeable risks of its conduct.
Proximate cause inquires into the extent of liability. It is here in
proximate cause that questions pertaining to the foreseeability of a
particular type of harm or the foreseeability of harm to a particular
class of persons are properly addressed. We have a duty: Mrs.
Palsgraf was a ticket-purchasing passenger standing on the platform,
at risk from carelessly operated trains. We have a breach: the jury
found that the train should not have pulled out of the station with its
doors opened and that the railroad's servants should not have pulled
and shoved the boarding passengers onto the moving train. But the
risk realized-harm to Mrs. Palsgraf by exploding fireworks-is not
the risk that we had in mind when we were contemplating duty and
breach.
2. Reconstituting Duty
Richard Posner's explication of how the Hand Formula applies
to the claim of an inspector of railroad cars-whose legs were
partially severed when a train that he was inspecting moved without
warning-is an instructive counterpoint to Cardozo's Palsgraf
opinion. Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp.96 reminds us that the
question to be asked is not whether injury to the plaintiff himself
might reasonably have been foreseen if the train were to start without
warning.97 The question to be asked is whether injury to someone
might reasonably be foreseen:
Although the crew had no reason to think that Davis was
under a car, someone-whether an employee of Conrail or
96. 788 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1266 ("the standard of care is set with reference to the average person").
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some other business invitee to the yard (such as Davis)-
might have been standing in or on a car or between cars, for
purposes of making repairs or conducting an inspection;
and any such person could be severely, even fatally, injured
if the train pulled away without any warning or even just
moved a few feet.98
Just as duty protects a class of persons-those who might
foreseeably be endangered by carelessness on some actor's part-so
too it applies to a category of harm-to the risk of physical injury.
There is no general duty not to carelessly inflict economic loss or
emotional distress on other people.
This analysis of whether harm is foreseeable does not
disaggregate different persons and their interests; it looks to all
reasonably foreseeable risks of physical injury imposed when a train
starts without warning and asks if that universe of reasonably
foreseeable risk is sufficient to require the exercise of care. It does
not treat the interests of "an inspector who had crawled under the car
(low P)... an inspector leaning on a car, a railroad employee doing
repairs on the top of a car, a brakeman straddling two cars, and
anyone else who might have business in or on (as well as under) a
car"99 as separate and distinct. It does not isolate each of these
separate persons, separate out any property interests they might have,
and examine each one in isolation from all the others. It treats this
imagined list of potentially endangered persons as the set of interests
that must be considered in determining whether any care at all must
be exercised.
The case for a duty of care in Palsgraf is really no different.
Here, too, the judgment that a duty of care is owed rests on the
98. Id. at 1264. Posner continues with this theme in explaining why the precaution of
blowing the train's horn was justified:
Blowing the hom would have saved not only an inspector who had crawled under the
car (low P[robability]), but also an inspector leaning on a car, a railroad employee
doing repairs on the top of a car, a brakeman straddling two cars, and anyone else who
might have business in or on (as well as under) a car.
Id. Posner famously endorses an economic conception of negligence that is properly criticized as
not relational. His economic conception takes negligence law to be directed at the maximization
of wealth and that as a way of maximizing the overall welfare of a population. This view rejects
the idea of duty as obligation to other people. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. This
non-relational approach to duty does not, however, impair Posner's account of the "calculus of
risk." Judge Posner is capable of fine lawyering.
99. Davis, 788 F.2d at 1264.
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combined importance of all the reasonably foreseeable risks of injury
involved. It is evident in general that the operation of a railroad is
the sort of thing that is likely to inflict injury unless care is exercised,
and it is evident in particular that caution is required when trains are
pulling in and out of stations. There are risks to passengers on the
train, to passengers boarding and exiting the train, and to passengers
waiting on the platform. This universe of foreseeable risk is more
than sufficient to justify the imposition of a duty of care, and that
duty governs the conduct before the court.' 0
The process of taking into account all endangered interests,
moreover, continues when we move from duty (the question of
whether an actor is under an obligation to exercise due care) to the
question of breach (the question of just what care is due). The
benefits of care are measured by all the reasonably foreseeable harm
that care averts. In Palsgraf, we take account of all those who were
endangered by the railroad's careless actions: the anonymous
passengers themselves and their packages to be sure, but also the
passengers aboard the train and on the platform. The passengers on
the train might be injured if the passengers trying to board lost their
balance and fell onto the tracks, forcing the train to slam on its
brakes. The passengers waiting on the platform might be injured if
these would-be boarders were cast back onto the platform and
knocked other people down. Just how far the havoc might go-can
we reasonably foresee passengers waiting on the platform toppling
like dominoes or not?-is an open question, but the reasonably
foreseeable harm from the railroad's foolish actions is not confined
to the anonymous passengers alone, much less to their unmarked
package of fireworks.
Judgments of breach are thus more particular than judgments of
duty, but they are not tailored to the demands of particular people.
They are tailored to the class of all people put at foreseeable risk of
physical injury. When the claims of different subclasses within this
group pull in conflicting directions, reasonable precaution typically
requires not the taking of different precautions for the benefit of
different classes-that happy solution may be infeasible-but the
100. In fact, the hazards of travel were once regarded as so great that an especially stringent
duty of care applied: "It must be remembered that the plaintiff was a passenger of the defendant,
and entitled to have the defendant exercise the highest degree of care required of common
carriers." Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 225 N.Y.S. 412, 414 (App. Div. 1927).
1260
PUTTING "DUTY" IN ITS PLACE
striking of a balance between the competing claims of those
endangered. Suppose, for example, that railroad cars are equipped
with two kinds of brakes. One kind secures more safety for the
train's passengers but imposes a greater risk on motorists crossing
the tracks; the other kind protects motorists more effectively but
imposes greater risks on passengers. If the railroad "owe[s] to its
passengers the . . . duty . . . to exercise the utmost care for their
safety" and to the motorists crossing its tracks only "the duty of
exercising ordinary care," this case comes as close as any we know
to matching Palsgraf s picture of distinct duties."1 Even in this
special case, however, the determination of the correct precaution
requires reconciling the competing claims of motorists and
passengers. More safety for passengers comes at the cost of less
safety for motorists, and vice versa. The greater stringency of one of
the duties owed only influences the choice of the correct precaution.
When duty is cashed out concretely in the form of a particular
precaution, that precaution reflects the competing claims of all those
to whom duty is owed. Precaution is no more personal than duty.
In Palsgraf itself, moreover, neither general duty nor more
particular precaution are noticeably complex, much less unusually
personal. The duty of utmost care owed by the Long Island Railroad
was owed without differentiation to all those whom reasonable
foresight would recognize as unacceptably endangered if such care
was not exercised. The norm of conduct distilled by asking if the
railroad breached that duty of care--do not pull trains out of stations
with their doors open, restrain passengers from boarding moving
trains instead of helping them to hop on-is more precise than the
duty to exercise the highest care in the circumstances, but it is no
more tailored to the particularities of different potential victims'
situations. It protects all those endangered by the railroad's careless
conduct.
3. Restoring Proximate Cause to Its Proper Place
Personalizing duty sows confusion in part because it distorts
duty doctrine itself and collapses the line between duty and breach.
However, it also sows confusion because it blurs the distinction
between duty and proximate cause-between existence of obligation
101. Lucchese v. S.F.-Sacramento R.R. Co. 289 P. 188, 189 (Cal. 1930).
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and extent of liability. To begin to restore duty to its proper place we
need to recall the prosaic truths behind the standard classification of
Palsgraf as a proximate cause case." 2 Why, in the face of Cardozo's
protestations to the contrary, do casebook editors and treatise writers
routinely classify Palsgraf as a proximate cause case? Perhaps for
the simple reason that duty, breach and cause in fact are all present:
the Long Island Railroad owed a duty of utmost care (both to the
passengers on the train and the prospective passengers waiting on the
platform); it breached its duty of care when its train pulled out of the
station while its employees pushed and pulled the anonymous
passengers onto the moving train; and that breach was the cause in
fact of the injury to Mrs. Palsgraf. The question before the court was
thus a question about extent of liability: should the Long Island
Railroad be liable to Mrs. Palsgraf, given the freakish way in which
she was injured? On the one hand, the railroad breached a duty of
care to Mrs. Palsgraf, and she was in fact seriously injured by that
breach. On the other hand, the injury arose out of a risk-the risk of
an exploding package knocking scales down on the other end of the
platform and injuring a woman who appears to have been some
distance from the site of the negligence-which was not among the
risks whose foreseeability justified the duty of care that the railroad
breached.
Cardozo and Andrews come to their conflicting judgments about
the scope of the railroad's liability by invoking competing criteria of
responsibility for harm done. 3 Read through the lens of proximate
cause, Cardozo's opinion asserts that liability should not extend to
Mrs. Palsgraf because the harm that befell her was not within the
scope of the risk that made the Long Island Railroad's conduct
102. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 445 (2000) (referring to Palsgraf as "[tihe most
famous American case on proximate cause"); RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 456 (8th ed. 2004) (discussing Palsgraf in connection with proximate cause issues); JOHN
C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, Aligning the Elements:
Proximate Cause and Palsgraf, in TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 265 (2004): see
also Warren Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 385
(1939) (describing the class of cases into which Palsgraf falls as cases "in which the defendant's
negligence is a sine qua non or necessary antecedent of the accident, but in which the question
still remains whether the defendant has committed a tort to the plaintiff'). Like every other
aspect of the Palsgraf case, this characterization can be and has been contested, and by Professors
Goldberg and Zipursky themselves. See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55. But it
remains by far the dominant characterization.
103. See Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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negligent.0 " The reasons that justify the imposition of a duty of care
in the first place should also limit the scope of liability for its breach.
Andrews appeals to the principle that unforeseeable harm ought to be
borne by the party culpably responsible for inflicting it, even when
that culpability arises from the breach of a duty of care imposed to
guard against other risks." 5 Andrews asserts that when a duty is
owed to the complaining plaintiff and that duty is breached, culpable
risk creation suffices to justify liability for harm unforeseeably
inflicted. 6 The choice between these competing principles is fair
grist for the judicial mill. 7 To settle the issue of the railroad's
liability by asking if it breached a duty that it owed to Mrs. Palsgraf
personally, however, conflates the question of whether the railroad
breached a duty of care with the question of whether liability for that
104. Id. at 99-101 (majority opinion).
105. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). Andrews states:
There needs be duty due the one complaining, but this is not a duty to a particular
individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the
natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may
complain. . . . Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not confined to
those who might probably be hurt."
Id. Both Seavey and Prosser take as the core of Andrews' dissent the principle that unforeseeable
injury should be laid at the door of the party culpably responsible for creating the risk that
resulted in that injury. See Seavey, supra note 102, at 386 ("An innocent person has been hurt;
some one must bear the loss. The defendant's employee was negligent .... The fact that neither
he nor his innocent employer had reason to believe that a momentary clumsiness might lead to
great liability is not of itself sufficient to deny it."); William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1953) ("The plaintiff has been hurt and some one must bear the loss.
Essentially, the choice is between an innocent plaintiff and a defendant who is admittedly at
fault."). For discussion of the place of this principle in the law, see generally HERBERT L. A.
HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 259-75 (2d ed. 1985). A respectable case can
be made that the conflict between Cardozo and Andrews is merely one instance of a recurring
conflict between two contending principles of tort law--"No Liability Without Fault" and "As
Between Two Innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Damage Pay." See J.M. Balkin, The
Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 22 (1986) (arguing that this
conflict is endemic to tort law).
106. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 103.
107. Indeed, Cardozo's holding could plausibly be defended as a finding of "no proximate
cause" as a matter of law. We regard this as an eminently defensible position, not so much
because harm to Mrs. Palsgraf strikes us as unforeseeable but because the risk of explosion does
not strike us as one of the risks that made the Railroad's conduct negligent. Note that on this "no
proximate cause" view of the case there is no "completed wrong" to Mrs. Palsgraf. One of the
elements of a negligence claim is absent. Because it articulates the intuition that Mrs. Palsgraf
has been "injured but not wronged" this interpretation of Palsgraf captures some of the relational
concerns that matter both to us and to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky. Shielding Duty, supra
note 36. As with "no breach as a matter of law" rulings, "no proximate cause as a matter of law"
rulings should be limited to situations where no reasonable jury could find that the cause was
proximate; otherwise, such determinations impinge on the province of the jury.
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breach encompasses her harm. When the two questions are
conflated, it is all but impossible to answer either of them correctly.
B. Existence of Obligation and Extent of Liability
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky's reading of Palsgraf leads
them to distort the respective domains of duty and proximate cause
more generally.' The problem surfaces most clearly in their
discussion of the KFC case, where Goldberg and Zipursky quite
rightly observe that there is no general duty to avoid inflicting even
severe emotional injury. 9 The mistake here is that this observation
does not go far enough. It is equally erroneous (we think) to
conclude that there are special duties of care to avoid inflicting
emotional distress."0 The negligent infliction of emotional distress
("NIED") is not a question of duty at all; it is a matter of proximate
cause. NIED cases involve either plaintiffs who are bystanders
physically unharmed but emotionally traumatized by the negligent
imposition of a risk of physical injury, or plaintiffs who have
preexisting relationships with the parties whose negligence inflicts
emotional injury on them."' In the former class of cases, duty exists
because physical injury to a class of persons including the plaintiff is
108. Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 354-358.
109. Id. at 356.
110. Id. at 357. Goldberg and Zipursky write:
Although California's expansion of duty famously includes the recognition of new
duties to take care not to cause others emotional harm, even under California law there
was no basis for concluding that a restaurant such as KFC owed a duty to take care to
avoid causing emotional harm to a patron such as Brown in a situation such as the one
it faced.
Id. California courts did, of course, expand liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. But this expansion of liability does not involve duty in the relevant sense because duty is
not an element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (or any other intentional tort
claim). KFC itself fits our description of NIED as a matter of proximate cause not duty. See
infra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
111. This is controversial. The alternative view is that in preexisting relationship cases the
special nature of the relationship gives rise to a duty to protect the plaintiff from severe emotional
harm. Reasons of space prohibit us from pursuing this debate here. Parallel questions arise in
cases involving recovery for negligent infliction of pure economic loss. In these cases, too, there
is either physical injury risked to someone or a preexisting relationship which gives rise to an
independent duty of care (e.g., the relationship of accountant to client). See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 79, at 657-64. Cases discussing pure economic loss in the context of product liability
law show how the rule that there is no liability for pure economic loss in tort is a general rule of
duty, which shunts purely economic harm out of tort law and into contract law. These are cases
where the product failure does not risk physical injury to anyone. The flip side of this coin is that
the economic expectancies involved are the proper subject of the law of contract. Compare id. at
968-73, with Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 273-74.
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reasonably foreseeable, and that is sufficient to give rise to a duty of
care. In the latter class of cases, preexisting relationships give rise to
duties of care. In both kinds of cases duty exists independent of the
prospect of emotional injury being negligently inflicted. Liability for
emotional injury arises as a question of the extent of the defendant's
liability for the consequences of its breach of a duty based on the
foreseeability of other harm."1 2
In bystander cases-Dillon v. Legg113 is likely the most
famous-the duty owed and breached is the duty not to impose an
unreasonable risk of physical injury. That duty fixes the standard of
conduct to which the defendant must conform his or her conduct, and
it protects the class of persons that includes the plaintiff."4  The
question before the court is whether breach of that duty should give
rise to liability for severe emotional distress-whether risk of
physical injury wrongfully imposed should result in liability for
severe (and eminently foreseeable) emotional distress actually
inflicted. Preexisting relationship cases-examples include cases
involving doctors and patients, and involving morticians and the
112. This claim is controversial and we cannot defend it in detail here. For some defense, see
the materials in KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, at 657-76 and the accompanying sections of the
Teacher's Manual. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 46
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (treating negligent infliction of emotional distress as an
independent category of liability).
113. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). Erin Lee Dillon was killed by a negligent driver. Id. at 914.
Her mother and her sister were present at the scene of the accident. Though they were physically
uninjured, they brought suit alleging that they had each suffered "great emotional disturbance and
shock" from witnessing Erin's death. Id. The trial court dismissed the mother's claim because
she was not within the zone of physical danger created by the defendant's negligence; the sister's
claim was permitted to go forward because she had been closer to the accident and might have
"feared for her own safety." Id. at 915. The California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of
the mother's claim and repudiated the "zone of danger" rule (which itself recognized the principle
that negligent infliction of emotional distress was actionable only where there was a breach of a
preexisting duty, such as the duty to use reasonable care to protect plaintiffs physical safety). Id.
114. See, e.g., Battala v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 729-30 (N.Y. 1961) (permitting recovery of
emotional damages by an infant plaintiff who was placed in a chair lift at a ski resort by an
employee who negligently failed to latch the belt on the lift; plaintiff became hysterical during the
descent and experienced consequential injuries); Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109
(Ohio 1983) (permitting recovery for serious emotional distress by a plaintiff who escaped
physical harm when a large sheet of glass negligently fell off of defendant's truck onto the
highway and crashed into the windshield of plaintiff's vehicle); Johnson v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W.Va. 1991) (plaintiff security guard was bitten by an HIV-positive
hospital patient and brought suit seeking recovery for NIED; after reviewing the case law the
court remarked: "It is evident from the above cases that before a recovery for emotional distress
damages may be made due to a fear of contracting a disease, such as AIDS, there must first be
exposure to the disease. If there is no exposure, then emotional distress damages will be
denied.").
1265
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1225
families of those they bury"' 5-are structurally the same. Duty arises
out of the preexisting relationship between the parties, not out of the
freestanding possibility of emotional injury being negligently
inflicted. The duty of care that physicians owe patients is not
imposed because physician carelessness is likely to result in
emotional distress. Physical injury is the more obvious and
worrisome risk of negligent medical care. Liability for emotional
distress arises once again as a matter of proximate cause, as a
question of whether the breach of a duty of care imposed to guard
against physical harm should expose the defendant to liability for any
emotional injury actually inflicted.
Explaining just why duty exists in negligent infliction cases
involving the mishandling of the dead by morgues is, no doubt,
difficult. The impersonal value that requires respect for the dead,
including proper disposal of dead bodies, is neither easy to articulate
nor to justify. Calling the interest at stake a "quasi-property right" is
crude at best. But it is easy to see that the duty to exercise care in
tending to the disposal of the dead does not arise from the prospect
of emotional distress on the part of the family in the event that a dead
body is mishandled. Many businesses cause their customers
foreseeable emotional distress by failing to discharge their
contractual duties adequately. If the prospect of emotional distress
sufficed to trigger duty in tort, liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress would be pervasive. It is not. Liability for
mishandling the dead is a special case. Importantly, the family's
115. E.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203 (Alaska 1995) (permitting recovery for
NIED in a case where defendant doctor negligently misdiagnosed plaintiff as having AIDS and
asserting that outside the context of bystander cases "a plaintiff's right to recover emotional
damages caused by mere negligence should be limited to those cases where the defendant owes
the plaintiff a preexisting duty"). The court also noted that "[a] growing number of jurisdictions
have adopted this approach." Id. In Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (App. Div.
2001), a malpractice claim against fertility clinic which mistakenly implanted plaintiff's embryo
into the uterus of another woman was allowed to proceed, even though plaintiffs sought to
recover only for emotional harm because "[d]amages for emotional harm can be recovered even
in the absence of physical injury 'when there is a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, [and a]
breach of that duty result[s] directly in emotional harm."' Id. (quoting Kennedy v. McKesson
Co., 448 N.E. 2d 1332, 1334 (N.Y. 1983) (alterations in the original))). In Guth v. Freeland, 28
P.3d 982 (Haw. 2001), plaintiff family members were permitted to recover for emotional distress
caused by defendant morgue's mishandling of the body of plaintiff's mother. "[T]he duty to use
reasonable care in the preparation of a body for funeral, burial, or crematory services... runs to
the decedent's immediate family members .... Id. at 990. "Many courts have.., recognized
that the nearest relatives of the deceased have a quasi-property right in the deceased's body that
arises from their duty to bury the deceased." Id. at 986 n.4.
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distress arises from its sense of having failed to discharge its duty to
ensure a decent burial. The mortician, in agreeing to perform
services, has knowingly accepted delegation of that duty. Family
and undertaker, then, are both bound by the same duty. The duty
attaches to their roles, albeit for different reasons. Undertakers owe
duties of care to the families of the dead whose bodies they handle
because those families have delegated-and those undertakers have
assumed-a part of the families' duties to give the dead a decent
burial. The special gravity of this value justifies the law's
intervention.
That negligent infliction cases are proximate cause cases is
confirmed by the arguments courts use to justify the imposition of
liability in such cases, and to gauge its extent. One prominent
argument is an argument of relative culpability and proportionality:
"Unlike an award of damages for intentionally caused emotional
distress which is punitive, the award for NIED simply reflects
society's belief that a negligent actor bears some responsibility for
the effect of his conduct on persons other than those who suffer
physical injury.""' 6
Put differently, the argument is that defendant's culpable risk
imposition is the basis for concluding that it is only just for the
defendant to bear some responsibility for the terrible emotional harm
that he has wrought by his breach of his duty of care to the plaintiff.
It is only just for the extent of the defendant's liability to exceed the
scope of his duty. This argument appeals to the intuition at the heart
of Judge Andrews' Palsgraf dissent: that justice favors placing the
cost of a harmful but unforeseeable outcome at the feet of the party
culpably responsible for causing the harm."7
To be sure, this basis of liability violates precepts dear to
defenders of the purity of "private law": culpable risk creation is the
ground of liability and the principle of responsibility at work sounds
not in corrective but in retributive justice."8  It is unjust for a
116. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989).
117. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
118. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 78, at 158-64 expresses the corrective justice
objection to making risk imposition the basis of liability in an unqualified way: Predicating
liability on culpable risk creation violates the correlativity required by corrective justice.
Correlativity requires that the harm suffered by the plaintiff be the same harm culpably risked by
the defendant. When this is not the case, the defendant has not violated the plaintiff's right; and
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severely injured victim to be saddled with the full cost of her injury
while the party responsible for inflicting it escapes scotfree. The
intuition on which these doctrines rest is that a finding of "no
liability" would be disproportional to the wrong done to the plaintiff
by the defendant, and that is a retributive intuition. But the lesson
here is that our law of torts is not the pure expression of corrective
justice that Ernest Weinrib, for one, takes it to be." 9 Here, it prefers
the competing claims of retributive justice. 2 ' To be sure,
considerations of retributive justice do not justify the imposition of
the duty of reasonable care in the first place, but that simply
underscores the fact that different considerations are relevant to the
existence of obligation and the extent of liability.
A second characteristic justification also marks negligent
infliction cases as proximate cause cases. That justification comes to
all that the defendant has done is violate some other person's right to be free of unreasonable risk
of physical injury. This emphasis on strict correlativity of doing and suffering-of defendant's
wrong and plaintiff's right-leads Professor Weinrib to object both to the relaxation of factual
causation, and to proximate cause doctrines which impose liability for injuries which do not fall
within the scope of the defendant's negligence. See id. at 153-57 (insisting on traditional factual
causation of harm and objecting to "probabilistic causation" and the imposition of liability on the
basis of culpable risk creation); id. at 160-61 (praising Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion and criticizing
Andrews' opinion). Professor Zipursky aligns himself with this general approach to factual cause
in Arthur Ripstein and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 75, 214 (criticizing much "market share"
liability because it does not satisfy the requirement of correlativity, inter alia).
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky jointly object to imposing liability in cases where
there is duty, breach, cause in fact and injury, but where the injury inflicted is not the injury
against which the duty was directed. See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 55, at 1828-29
("Our negligence law does not give a plaintiff a right of action against anyone who injured him,
but only against a defendant who breached a duty not to injure him." (footnote omitted)). To
sustain this thesis, they do and must construe negligent infliction cases as "limited duty" cases.
Id. at 1832-34. This recognition of a "limited duty" not to inflict emotional distress is arbitrary.
If there is indeed a duty to avoid inflicting emotional distress, that duty should be general in the
way that the duty to avoid inflicting physical injury is. It should attach whenever emotional
injury is to be foreseen. By contrast, if recovery for NIED is a matter of proximate cause, it can
more readily be limited to only those circumstances where it is justified by considerations of
proportionality and deterrent effectiveness.
119. WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 78, at 153-54. "Private law" is not pure in the way
that Weinrib imagines, as his critics have pointed out. See John Gardner, The Purity and Priority
of Private Law, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 459, 470 (1996) (criticizing Weinrib's thesis that the "form
taken by a part of private law must be the form taken by the whole of private law."); Simons,
supra note 72.
120. For a brief discussion, see TONY HONORE, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 85-90 (1999).
See also Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, 387, 390-91, 406 (David. G. Owen ed., 1995) (noting both that
notions of proportionality and retributive justice cannot be entirely expunged from the law of torts
even though the justice of tort law is not primarily the justice of retribution).
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the fore in cases where breach of duty does not issue in physical
injury-either to the plaintiff bringing suit, to anyone else, or in the
normal case of a breach of this sort. Mishandling a corpse is a case
in point. If the decedent's immediate family members cannot
recover, "there will often be no one to hold defendants accountable
for their negligent handling of dead bodies. A defendant does not
owe a duty of care to the decedent, who is not himself actually
harmed by the defendant's actions. 12' In the absence of liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the duty of care itself will
be toothless because its breach will have no adverse consequences
for the breaching party. Here the concern is less retributive and more
instrumental. It matters that duties of care be honored in practice,
and we therefore have reasons sounding in deterrence to see to it that
those whose negligence fortuitously inflicts only severe emotional
distress do not escape "scotfree." This concern with fixing the scope
of liability at a level that will deter wrongful conduct is
quintessentially a concern of proximate cause doctrine.' 22 It is also
quintessentially instrumental-and properly so. The law of torts
ought to care about its own efficacy. Rights are supposed to be
efficacious.
We have, by now, tramped through a thicket of cases and
doctrines in pursuit of what might be thought an esoteric, taxonomic
debate among tort professors. Some of the time, though, taxonomy
121. Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 982, 989 (Haw. 2001). Negligent misdiagnosis of a patient as
HIV-positive (Chizmar) and negligent implantation of a patient's embryo in the uterus of another
woman (Perry-Rogers) are other examples of negligence which do not physically injure victims.
Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d. 196 (Alaska 1995); Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28
(App. Div. 2001). In Barber Lines v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985), Judge
Breyer explains a parallel exception to the general rule that there is no liability for negligent
infliction of pure economic loss: "Awarding damages for financial harm caused by negligent
misrepresentation is special in that, without such liability, tort law would not exert significant
financial pressure to avoid negligence; a negligent accountant lacks physically harmed victims as
potential plaintiffs."). Id. at 56.
122. DOBBS, supra note 102, at 443 ("Proximate cause rules are among those rules that seek
to determine the appropriate scope of a negligent defendant's liability."); W. PAGE KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 273 (1984) (identifying proximate cause as being concerned
with the "scope of liability").
Contract concerns also justify the availability of negligent infliction of emotional distress
liability as a way around the problem that the dead person cannot sue when her corpse is
mishandled. Obviously, the mortician is paid to perform a professional service, up to
professional standards, and liability is necessary to ensure that the service paid for is provided.
Thus NIED fills a gap where breach of contract remedies may not be adequate to ensure that
contracts are performed.
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matters. Personalizing duty is a mistake with potentially serious
consequences. "Because of the elasticity of the concept of duty, it is
always possible for a court to characterize and analyze every issue in
a negligence case in terms of duty." '123 When duty is conceived as
strongly relational, the concept escapes from its proper domain,
sheds the restraints of its traditional role, and begins to pervade the
whole of a tort case in a diffuse and protean way. Duty no longer
functions to determine the existence of an obligation in tort-to
determine whether or not the defendant was required to exercise
reasonable care for the protection of a class of persons, including the
plaintiff. Instead, it becomes a license to determine the exact
contours and scope of the obligation owed to any particular
plaintiff."' Duty begins to swallow breach and proximate cause. It
is converted from the first element of plaintiff's case and a non-issue
in most cases into the master concept of negligence law. This
deforms tort doctrine and invites the very kind of judicial abuse that
disturbs us-a degradation of the judicial role and a usurpation of the
jury's role by collapsing the line between law articulation and law
application. Goldberg and Zipursky may not intend for this to
happen, but this is the path down which their personalization of duty
points.
The remainder of our Reply will proceed in four steps. First, in
Part III we shall address briefly Shielding Duty's account of the
doctrine of assumption of risk. There is, it seems, a doctrinal
impasse between us and Professors Goldberg and Zipursky; we
believe that primary assumption of the risk is a form of assumption
of the risk and they do not. Second, in Part IV we shall take up
Goldberg and Zipursky's argument that our critique of the level of
generality at which California courts are issuing duty rulings is
grossly underspecified. Third, in Part V we will discuss Record v.
123. Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d 610, 625 (Cal. 2007) (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
124. See McGettigan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 67 Cal. Rptr.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1997)
(deciding that a duty of care was owed to passengers exiting or entering trains, but not to
passengers on the platform awaiting trains, or to passengers on the platform en route out of the
station). We think that the duty owed in this situation does not depend on such things as whether
the victim was done exiting a train or had not yet begun to board one, but extends to all
reasonably foreseeable victims of the careless conduct on the railroad's part, simply because harm
to them is reasonably foreseeable. On a strongly relational conception of "duty," however, facts
this detailed may speak to the "duty-breach nexus."
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Reason 21 in the hope of clarifying why we claim that judges are
taking it upon themselves to act as juries. Last, in Part V we will
also revisit KFC1 26 in order to illustrate how the "no duty" rulings
now proliferating in California courts fail to fix general legal
standards.
III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK REVISITED
Shielding Duty asserts that "[i]mplied assumption of risk is
simply not a 'no duty' doctrine. It is instead a defense that turns on
what a particular plaintiff subjectively understands and voluntarily
chooses to do.... [A]ssumption of risk is not about the absence of a
duty of reasonable care .... ."' We confess to being perplexed.'28
Case law and commentary unequivocally assert that implied
secondary assumption of risk is a defense to a breach of a duty of
care, and that implied primary assumption of risk is a genuine "no
duty" doctrine.'29 Although we are unsure just what kind of
argument will persuade Goldberg and Zipursky that primary
assumption of risk is a form of implied assumption of risk, we feel
compelled to revisit the matter, both to make clear our disagreement
with Shielding Duty on this point and because we suspect that
Goldberg and Zipursky's difficulty understanding what we mean
when we call rulings of "no duty" insufficiently categorical is
125. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Ct. App. 1999).
126. Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Cal. 1997).
127. Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 344-45.
128. Perhaps Goldberg and Zipursky are asserting that-even though primary assumption of
risk is universally thought by courts and commentators to be a version of assumption of risk-it is
not really a version of assumption of risk because the only "true" version of the doctrine is "a
defense that turns on what a particular plaintiff subjectively understands and voluntarily chooses
to do." Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 344. If this is what they mean, they need to say far
more than they do. Among other things, this claim needs to be defended even in the case of the
classical defense. See Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 291 (describing classical assumption of
risk). The gist of the "realist" critique of the classical defense was that the defense had nothing to
do with plaintiffs' choices and everything to do with defendants' wrongful actions. Id. at 292-93.
Defendants could relieve themselves of their ostensible duty of care by making unsafe conditions
"open and obvious" thereby forcing plaintiffs either to bear the risk or leave the job. Id. at 292.
Put differently, simply by flagrantly and blatantly disregarding its duty to provide a reasonably
safe workplace an employer could rid itself of that duty. Id. at 293. As a practical matter,
therefore, the defense eliminated the duty of reasonable care and replaced it with a duty to make
unsafe conditions "open and obvious." Id. at 314. This opens the classical doctrine up to the
charge that it was not really a defense that allowed parties to consent to careless risk imposition
but a de facto doctrine of reduced duty. See id. at 291 (describing and critiquing the development
of the assumption of risk doctrine).
129. See, e.g., Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959).
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entangled with their (mis)understanding of primary assumption of
risk.3
Classical assumption of risk-the doctrine of implied
assumption of risk developed during the latter part of the nineteenth
century-was an absolute defense to negligence liability. 3' Over the
course of the twentieth century the classical defense underwent a
slow, and conceptually elaborate, decline. 3 2 First, the classical
doctrine was narrowed without being either overthrown or formally
restructured. Exploiting the elasticity of the concepts of
"knowledge" and "consent," courts and commentators began to insist
that, for assumption of risk to apply, the plaintiff must be
"subjectively" aware of the risk that she was assuming and her
assumption must be truly "voluntary."'3  Second, courts and
commentators restructured the now narrowed doctrine. Implied
assumption of risk was divided into "primary" and "secondary"
forms. 34 The "primary" form of the doctrine holds that in some
circumstances-almost always recreational ones-no duty of
ordinary care ever arises.'35 "Secondary" assumption of risk is quite
a different matter, both conceptually and practically. The
"secondary" form of implied assumption of risk is, like contributory
negligence, a defense to a breach of an established duty of care.'36
130. Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 343. Goldberg and Zipursky write:
On the one hand, [Esper & Keating] seem to want to endorse Knight's treatment of
primary assumption of risk as a genuine 'no duty' defense, which renders primary
assumption of risk a question of law. On the other, they want to leave it to juries to
decide in each case whether the victim of an injury incurred in the course of a
recreational activity counts as the realization of a risk 'inherent' in that activity.
Id. What we want is for California courts to treat primary assumption of risk in the way that
every otherjurisdiction that recognizes the doctrine does: we want California courts to reserve the
choice of legal standard-the question of whether the doctrine of primary assumption of risk
applies to the kind of (recreational) activity before the court-to themselves and to leave the
application of the standard-the question of whether the risk which materialized in this case was
inherent in the activity-to the jury.
131. Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 291.
132. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703-04 (Cal. 1992); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1226, 1240-41 (Cal. 1975); DOBBS, supra note 102, at 535; 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.1 (1st ed. 1956); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 122, at
330.
133. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: ASSUMPTION OF RISK §§ 496(c),(e)
(1965); Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 481, 485
(2002).
134. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703.
135. Id. at 704.
136. Id. at 703.
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Unlike contributory negligence, however, "secondary" assumption of
risk is concerned with choice or consent, not with carefulness or
reasonableness. "Secondary" assumption of risk embodies the idea
that plaintiffs sometimes implicitly consent to the defendant's
negligent conduct. 37
The doctrine is, therefore, concerned not with the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of plaintiffs encounter with defendant's breach
of its duty of care, but with the voluntariness of that encounter.
Knowing, voluntary encounters with negligently created risks
operate to bar all recovery on the part of the person encountering the
risk.'38 The claim that people implicitly agree to relinquish their right
to be free of others' negligence came under sustained attack during
the first half of the twentieth century.'39 In response to that attack,
courts and commentators broke "secondary implied assumption of
risk" down further, into "reasonable" and "unreasonable" branches.
"Reasonable" implied secondary assumption of risk-such as
plaintiff Lamson's decision not to quit his job and so to run the risk
of being struck by a hatchet falling from an unsafe drying rack' 4 -
did not bar recovery or even reduce recovery. "Unreasonable"
implied secondary assumption of risk, by contrast, continued to bar
all recovery. 4' "This conceptual splitting of the doctrine effectively
137. Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 292.
138. Id. at 247.
139. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 699 (citing authorities).
140. See the discussion of Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900)
(Holmes, C.J.), in Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 292-93.
141. Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390 (Del. 1992); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834
P.2d 6, 13 (Wash. 1992); W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 497 (W. Page Keeton ed., 1984). Thus, we do not agree with Shielding Duty that courts
were wrestling with the kinds of situations described in its footnote 65 after the Li v. Yellow Cab,
532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) decision. See Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 347 n.65. We believe
that Li regards both of the cases that Goldberg and Zipursky describe as variants of contributory
negligence and so absorbed them into comparative negligence. Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at
295-95. The only form of assumption of risk which survived Li is the kind which reduces duty:
As for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this defense overlaps
that of contributory negligence to some extent and in fact is made up of at least two
distinct defenses. "To simplify greatly, it has been observed ... that in one kind of
situation, to wit, where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific
known risk imposed by a defendant's negligence, plaintiff's conduct, although he may
encounter that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form of contributory
negligence .... Other kinds of situations within the doctrine of assumption of risk are
those, for example, where plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant of an obligation
of reasonable conduct toward him. Such a situation would not involve contributory
negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care." (Grey v. Fibreboard
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abolished implied secondary assumption of risk as a distinct defense.
Because implied secondary assumption of risk now barred recovery
only when the conduct it covered was unreasonable, the defense was
now identical to the defense of contributory negligence. "142
The final stage in the classical doctrine's demise came with the
rise of comparative negligence. The triumph of comparative
negligence eliminated the last vestige of the classical defense-its
operation as a complete bar to recovery. With the rise of
comparative negligence, the plaintiffs failure to exercise due care
for her own protection was now compared with the defendant's
failure to exercise due care to protect others from the reasonably
foreseeable risks of her actions, and plaintiffs recovery was reduced
in proportion to her relative culpability. 143  At the end of this long
process, then, the classical doctrine of implied assumption of risk
was a sliver of its former self, and even that sliver was subdivided
into two smaller shreds. Implied "secondary" assumption of risk
operated as a bar to recovery only in the special circumstance of the
"firefighter's rule" prohibiting a firefighter from recovering from a
person who negligently started a fire; 144 every other part of the
defense was absorbed into comparative negligence. Implied
"primary" assumption of risk was confined to a limited domain of
recreational cases.'
45
Paper Prod. Co., 418 P.2d 153, 156 (1996)).
We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should
entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of
assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form
of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.
Li, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240. Reasonable or unreasonable, if defendant owed a duty of care the
defense was absorbed into comparative negligence.
142. Abusing "Duty, "supra note 1, at 293.
143. Lipson v. Super. Ct. of Orange Cty., 644 P.2d 822, 831 n.8 (Cal. 1982); Kendrick v. Ed's
Beach Serv., Inc., 577 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1991); Jacobsen Constr. Co., v. Structo-Lite Eng'g,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306, 312 (Utah 1980).
144. Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 614 (Cal. 1977), overruled on other grounds by
Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 351-52 (Cal. 1994); Terhell v. Am.
Commonwealth Assoc., 218 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (Ct. App. 1985); Santangelo v. State of N.Y.,
521 N.E.2d 770, 772 (N.Y. 1988), superseded by statute, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-106
(McKinney 2001), as recognized by Williams v. City of N.Y., 811 N.E.2d 1103 (N.Y. 2004).
145. California's revival of the doctrine began with its declaration that primary assumption of
the risk had survived the adoption of comparative negligence. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696,
707 (Cal. 1992). Knight's holding that primary assumption of risk applied to certain kinds of
recreational activities did no more than align California with the growing number of jurisdictions
that have recognized "primary" assumption of risk, and have applied it to recreational activities.
Id. at 710-11; Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 295. The devil was in the details-not in the
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The doctrine of "primary assumption of risk" that emerged from
this process of legal transformation is a form of assumption of risk.
It holds that participants in certain activities (outside California,
almost exclusively recreational activities) assume the "inherent"
risks of those activities and it predicates its applicability on the
choices of those it applies to-their choice to engage in the activity
at issue. And it is an implied form of assumption of risk: there is no
express agreement among the participants. The agreement is
imposed by law and its terms are spelled out by judges and juries.
To be sure, primary assumption of risk is also a form of "no duty"
doctrine; it holds that participants in or sponsors of activities subject
to the doctrine are not under a duty of reasonable care to reduce the
activities' inherent risks. That, however, is simply the (formal)
difference between primary and secondary implied assumption of
risk. Secondary assumption of risk holds that plaintiffs who
knowingly and voluntarily encounter breaches of duty waive their
right to complain of any harm they suffer. It is a defense in
substance as well as in procedural form.
In the hopes of closing the gap between our understanding of
primary assumption of risk and Goldberg and Zipursky's, it may help
to observe that primary assumption of risk is on the objective end of
the spectrum of assumption of risk doctrines. This is true in two
ways. First, the judgment that justifies the recognition of the
doctrine is objective. Primary assumption of the risk rests on a claim
about the character of the (recreational) activities that it covers-
namely, that the goods realized by those activities are fostered by
refraining from imposing a duty of reasonable care, and would be
frustrated by the imposition of a duty of reasonable care. Second, the
content of the norm that it imposes is objective. Primary assumption
of risk assumes that we can, by and large, agree on what the inherent
risks of the activities to which it applies are.'46  Objective
recognition of the doctrine but in its application-in California's peculiar conflation of law
articulation with law application. Abusing "Duty, " supra note I at 294-96.
146. This is a plausible assumption in the case of many sports because they are cooperative
endeavors governed by shared understandings; sharply divergent subjective understandings of
their inherent risks are a threat to their continued existence. Although we do not believe that
California had to recognize primary assumption of risk for recreational activities-not all
jurisdictions do-we do believe that primary assumption of risk is a more attractive regime for
recreational activities than the "pure" version of assumption of risk that Goldberg and Zipursky
endorse. See Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 342-51. Sharply diverging subjective
understandings of just which risks are permissible conflict with the shared understanding on
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understandings are not, however, peculiar to primary assumption of
risk. The canonical statement of the classical doctrine of implied
secondary assumption of risk hardly applied in Lamson v. American
Axe and Tool Co.' 47 defers to plaintiffs understanding that he had
objected to the risk that he was held to have assumed.141
We therefore believe that primary assumption of risk is a
genuine form of implied assumption of risk. It also happens to be a
"no duty" doctrine-not a true defense-and a highly objective form
of assumption of risk. These features locate primary assumption on
the map of assumption of risk doctrines, but they do not move it into
a different doctrinal domain.
IV. How GENERAL SHOULD DUTY RULINGS BE?
Shielding Duty rightly observes that we do not offer a general
account of the level of generality that duty rulings must take.149 This
complaint, however, asks the impossible. The question--"Precisely
how general should rulings of duty (and 'no duty') be?"-is no more
answerable than the question: "Precisely how general should the
decisions of common law courts be?" Is Cardozo's ruling in
MacPherson too general, exactly as general as it should be, or not
general enough?' We lack even a scale along which we could
measure duty rulings for their generality. And even if we possessed
such a scale, we could not say just how general different types of
legal rulings should be. We know that the rule of law is the
subjection of human conduct to governance by general norms,151 and
which cooperative enterprises like sports depend. Wisconsin is an example of a jurisdiction
which applies a negligence standard to recreational activities. See Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins.
Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993).
147. 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900).
148. Id. at 586 ("[Plaintiff] complained, and was notified that he could go if he would not face
the chance. He stayed and took the risk."). Our disapproval of Lamson is not predicated on its
objectivity. Our complaint is that the defendant was able to rid itself of its duty of care by
brazenly violating that duty.
149. Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 336.
150. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
151. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46 (1964) ("The first desideratum of a system
for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules is an obvious one: there must be rules.
This may be stated as the requirement of generality."). Cf H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW, 156-57, 202 (1961) (noting that because law is an attempt to control conduct by general
rules, "formal justice"-the principle that "like cases must be treated alike"-is integral to law);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 38 (Rev. ed., Belkhap, Harvard 1999) ("[F]ormal justice,
the regular and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when applied to
the legal system.").
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we can distinguish among types of legal norms-between more
narrow legal rules and more general legal standards, for instance-
but we cannot say that legal standards are sevens on some scale,
legal rules are threes on that scale and rulings in particular cases are
ones. What we can say is how the various elements of negligence
law differ from each other and why they should. This is the kind of
account we offered. It is more than imprecise if it is read as an
abstract account of appropriate degrees of generality-read this way
there is no account of the matter at all in our paper. Our account
gathers its meaning and its point from the way that it situates duty
within the larger fabric of negligence law.
Thus, when we said that legal rulings of duty and "no duty"
must be general, we meant first and foremost that the law of
negligence is deformed when courts issue rulings of duty and "no
duty" that are no more general than jury determinations in particular
cases. 52  Our point has both formal and substantive elements.
Formally, our point is that rulings of law must be general enough to
guide future conduct in similar situations. Rulings that do not reach
beyond the facts of the case at hand-such as Monreal's rule
governing when one must change lanes on the freeway153-fail this
test. Substantively, our point was that the standing of duty as a
question of law for courts grants to courts the legitimate authority to
elaborate law-to develop doctrines and rules covering recurring
Our inability to say exactly how general legal norms must be does not make it impossible for us
to distinguish between the "Kadi-justice" of wise men who decide cases in ways that they
perceive to be all things considered just on the facts at hand, and judges who settle disputes
through the application of preexisting norms. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 76-80
(1983); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 845, 976-78 (Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans.,
1978).
152. See Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 282
153. Recall Monreal v. Tobin, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168, 170 (Ct. App. 1998), where a "driver of a
vehicle traveling at the posted maximum speed limit in either the No. 2 lane or No. 3 lane of a dry
and straight four-lane freeway, at night, and in light traffic during clear weather" owes no duty
"to other drivers and any involved passengers.., to move his or her vehicle to the right into the
next slower lane when another driver approaches from behind in the same lane at a speed in
excess of the posted maximum speed limit."
Another California Court of Appeal recently decided that a driver that gestures to another
driver that it is safe to turn owes no duty to that driver and cannot be sued if the gesture was
negligent and it was in fact not safe to turn. Gilmer v. Ellington, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 896 (Ct.
App. 2008). The "relational" or personal aspect of the Gilmer holding is quite notable, the court
applies the factors originally announced in Rowland v. Christian to find that a duty does not arise
out of the relationship between a driver and somebody gesturing to that driver that it is safe to
proceed. Id. at 899-900. Focusing on the relationship between the parties promotes taking the
case away from the jury and awarding summary judgment to the defendant.
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categories of cases so long as those doctrines and rules involve the
reasoned elaboration, extension and revision of existing legal
materials.'54 Exemptions from obligation crafted in the name of "no
duty" ought not differ in kind. They, too, should draw on rationales
of some generality, and their scope should track their rationales.
155
Courts have, for example, the legitimate authority to decide that
various kinds of recreational activities should be governed by a
special exception to the general duty of reasonable care, in light of
the special features of those activities-principally, the fact that risk
is essential to their enjoyment. The proposition that these activities
will not flourish unless they are exempted from the ordinary duty of
reasonable care that would otherwise govern them is a reasonable
position. A reasonable state supreme court might adopt this position
as a general rule.
The flip side of this coin is that the authority granted to judges
by duty doctrine runs out when the articulation of law comes to an
end and the application of law begins. Because the duty of care
recognized by our law is both highly general-it has proven
enduringly resistant to recasting in the form of precise rules' 56 -and
close to universal in its extension-it is owed by everyone to
everyone else 57-- duty is a nonissue in most cases and there are few
legitimate opportunities for judges to exercise their powers of law
articulation under the doctrine. 5 8 In most cases, negligence law
requires judgments of "all things considered" reasonableness "based
154. See Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 296-300.
155. If, for example, a court claims that the competitive character of sports requires the
suspension of the duty of ordinary care the resulting rule of "no duty" should be limited to
competitive sports, not extended to all recreational activities. Here, we think our position is
congruent with the Third Restatement with its emphasis on categorical rules expressing general
principles or policies. The proposed final draft of the Third Restatement notes:
In some categories of cases, reasons of principle or policy dictate that liability should
not be imposed. In these cases, courts use the rubric of duty to apply general
categorical rules withholding liability.... No-duty rules are appropriate only when a
court can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to
a general class of cases.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005).
156. See Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 286 n.58 (discussing the fate of Holmes'
prescription and prophecy that courts ought to and would over time fix precise rules of conduct
through negligence adjudication); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 8 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
157. See Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 267-68.
158. Id. at 279-289.
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on the circumstances of each individual situation."'59  When law
application as opposed to law articulation is at issue, judges have
very limited authority to remove cases from juries. They may do so
only when reasonable people could not reasonably disagree over the
application of law to fact. When reasonable people might reasonably
disagree over the application of the law articulated by judges to the
facts of particular cases, courts do not have the legitimate authority
to decide the matter.
160
The role of the jury in negligence adjudication is part "imperfect
procedural justice" and part "pure procedural justice." '61 Juries are in
part a well-chosen instrument for determining whether the defendant
did in fact act reasonably and in part an intrinsically fair way of
resolving reasonable disagreement about what care was due. They
are a well-chosen instrument because juries represent a form of
collective judgment particularly appropriate to negligence cases.
Judges are likely better situated than juries to decide whether or not
matters of principle and policy require a heightened duty of care for
159. The Third Restatement notes:
[W]hat looks at first to be a constant or recurring issue of conduct in which many
parties engage may reveal on closer inspection many variables that can best be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Tort law has thus accepted an ethics of
particularism, which tends to cast doubt on the viability of general rules capable of
producing determinate results and which requires that actual moral judgments be based
on the circumstances of each individual situation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 8 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
2005). The phrase "ethics of particularism" is taken from Jonathan Dancy, Ethical Particularism
and Morally Relevant Properties, 92 MIND 530 (1983). In invoking the Third Restatement's
description of negligence adjudication here, we do not mean to be signing on to Dancy's
epistemological thesis that there are no general moral principles. Our point is more modest:
Negligence adjudication does not yield many legal rules. It applies a legal standard and yields
particular decisions.
The Third Restatement's apt emphasis on the contextual character of judgments of
reasonableness needs to be balanced by bearing in mind that jury adjudication can condemn as
negligent a widespread practice, thereby unsettling a wide swath of social life. See, e.g., Snyder
v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, 659 A.2d 482 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995). Snyder upheld a jury verdict
finding the American Association of Blood Banks negligent for failing to recommend that its
2,400 members nationwide conduct surrogate testing of blood as a precaution against transmitting
the HIV virus through blood transfusions. Id. at 490-95.
160. Abusing "Duty, "supra note 1, at 269 n.12.
161. For this distinction, see RAWLS, supra note 151, at 74-75. Imperfect procedural justice
applies when there is an independent criterion identifying the correct outcome, but no procedure
which always leads to the correct outcome. Pure procedural justice applies when there is no
independent criterion identifying the correct outcome, but there is a fair or correct procedure for
determining outcomes. In this case, the fairness or correctness of the procedure vouches for its
outcomes.
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experts and, of course, only judges can announce such a rule in a
manner that would render it applicable to future cases. Judges are no
better suited-and may in fact be less well suited-than ordinary
citizens to determine whether a driver acted unreasonably in not
changing lanes on the freeway to avoid an accident. The consensus
of twelve citizens, many of whom drive on similar freeways and
have had the common experience of driving too slow for a fast lane,
as well as the experience of driving behind someone who was doing
so, is a reliable index of the reasonableness of a driver's actions in
those situations.
The instrumental efficacy of jury adjudication is, however, only
one piece of the case for jury adjudication. Judgments of
reasonableness in concrete cases may often be debatable, and no
procedure, however well defined, may be able to dispel all doubt.
The intrinsic fairness of jury adjudication therefore matters along
with its instrumental efficacy. The law of negligence fixes an
abstract standard of public right governing our relations with one
another as members of a legal and moral community. It settles what
we may reasonably demand from each other in the way of reciprocal
regard for each other's safety. It does so by appealing to our
capacity to govern ourselves by reference to a shared sense of
reasonableness. Its norms implicitly claim that we would reasonably
agree to them, were we to work the matter for ourselves.'62 The
institutions of negligence adjudication spell out the content of
reasonable care. When enduring disagreement over just what this
shared moral conception demands in a particular case is to be
expected, it is eminently fair to ask a subset of citizens themselves to
decide what we may reasonably demand of one another in the way of
care. This, in any case, is the theory behind our jury system.'63
162. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311, 373-79. Cf RIPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 106-08.
163. A fascinating recent U.S. Supreme Court case demonstrates why even the most
accomplished judges, despite their competence in determining legal issues, are not in the best
position to judge questions of basic reasonableness. In Scott v. Harris, the issue was whether the
Fourth Amendment was violated when police officers terminated a high speed chase by ramming
the back of the suspect's car, causing the car to roll and catch fire and rendering the driver
permanently paralyzed. 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 (2007). The Fourth Amendment prohibits
"unreasonable" seizures, so the issue of whether the force was reasonable was in some ways
similar to a negligence issue (though whether or not it should be a jury question in the Fourth
Amendment context is of course beyond the scope of this Article). U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The
majority, speaking through Justice Scalia, emphasized that they believed that anyone who viewed
the videotape of the chase (which, in an unprecedented move, they placed on the Supreme Court's
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In Abusing "Duty," we criticized California courts for warping
both the conceptual and the institutional dimensions of duty
doctrine."6 On the one hand, we argued, California courts are not
articulating general legal rules; they are instead issuing cryptic, fact-
specific rulings.165 On the other hand, by issuing these cryptic
rulings confined to particular facts, they are usurping the role of the
jury, appropriating the task of law application to themselves in cases
where reasonable people might reasonably disagree over the
application of law to fact.166
We began from the premise that the negligence norm of
reasonable care in the circumstances is a classic instance-perhaps
even the classic instance-of a legal standard. Rules and standards
are different kinds of legal norms, in part because standards are more
general than rules and in part because the application of standards
calls for the exercise of evaluative moral judgment. "[A] rule may
be defined as a legal direction that requires for its application nothing
more than the determination of the happening or non-happening of
website) would believe that the force was reasonable. Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1775-76. The Court
came to this conclusion by emphasizing the high speed and potential danger to bystanders if the
chase continued. Id.
However, Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
emphasized the police sirens, and the fact that other drivers on the road seemed to be able to pull
to the side in time and nobody seemed to be in serious danger, in indicating that he did not think
it was reasonable to terminate the chase in so violent a fashion. Id. at 1782-83. This is a
powerful illustration of why these matters should be jury questions, at least in negligence law.
Nine of the most learned judges in the world view a videotape, applying a standard of
reasonableness, and come to divergent conclusions, emphasizing different facts. Tellingly, it
requires no specialized training in the law to form a reasoned opinion about the reasonableness of
the officers' actions. Equally telling, these judges are not peculiar in their disagreement. See
generally Dan M. Kahan, et al., Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1081227 (summarizing study of different persons' reactions to videotape
from Scott v. Harris). Jurors will, moreover, have more common experience to pool. Some
jurors may, for instance, have experience as pedestrians and/or drivers who have been proximate
to high speed chases, which they can bring into the jury room in evaluating what the level of
danger really was and whether it was reasonable for the officers to act. Those jurors, of course,
will be peers of the parties pulled from the local community rather than Supreme Court justices
who do not know the local roads or the local customs or the local drivers.
Making duty highly relational-personalizing duty-threatens to take more and more
cases out of the hands of juries and into the hands of trial and appellate judges whose opinions on
the issue of reasonableness are not likely to be any more learned than those of twelve jurors (and
who may lack the common sense and understanding of the community that jurors have).
164. Abusing "Duty," supra note 1.
165. See id. at 282.
166. Id. at 289.
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physical or mental events-that is, determinations of fact."'' 67 By
contrast, a "standard may be defined broadly as a legal direction
which can be applied only by making, in addition to a finding of
what happened or is happening in the particular situation, a
qualitative appraisal of these happenings. ..""' The application of a
standard to the idiosyncratic details of particular accidents presents a
mixed question of law and fact; it requires the exercise of evaluative
judgment as well as the finding of facts.'69
Standards thus differ from rules in two key respects. First, they
differ because their application requires the exercise of evaluative
judgment, an appraisal of whether or not the defendant's conduct
was reasonable. Second, standards differ from rules because their
application is more fact-specific. Applying a legal standard to a case
involves working out a highly circumstantial "rule" applicable to the
particular facts at hand. Decisions in particular cases are thus even
more specific than rules. The kind of law application that we
criticized as an "abuse of duty" is this kind of application-
application of law to facts in the form of rulings of "no duty" that
reach no farther than the undeveloped facts of the case before the
court. Duty is a question of law for the courts because it involves the
articulation of law-of a norm governing something more than the
facts of the case before the court. The application of law to the facts
in negligence cases is a matter for juries whenever reasonable people
might reasonably disagree over that application. The legitimate
authority of juries derives from different sources than the legitimate
authority of judges, and the legitimate province of jury adjudication
differs from the legitimate province of judicial authority.
The application of the reasonable person standard requires
bringing a number of considerations to bear,17° and reasonable people
167. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 139 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (citing the "idea of the common law that no person
should drive 'at an unreasonable rate of speed"' as a canonical example of a standard). A
canonical example of a legal rule is a precise statutory speed limit (e.g., 65 mph).
168. Id. at 140.
169. The classic statement of this proposition is Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law
and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 112 (1924). Bohlen stresses that the application of legal
standards necessarily raises mixed questions of law and fact.
170. See e.g., UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2 cmt. percentages of fault (1996)
(enumerating some of the factors relevant to the determination of negligent culpability: the
burden of the precaution necessary to prevent the accident, the probability and gravity of the
harm, the knowledge and capacity of the actor, the advertence or inadvertence of the relevant
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may reasonably disagree over how to evaluate the significance of
these considerations even when they agree on the facts. People may
reasonably disagree over the relative unreasonableness of
defendant's speeding through a yellow light on the crest of a hill, and
plaintiffs turning across three lanes of traffic beneath the crest of the
hill to enter the driveway of a service station, without making certain
that the coast is clear, for instance) 7' Were a court to settle the
relative culpabilities of this plaintiff and this defendant as a matter of
law, its ruling would be an arbitrary assertion that one reasonable
resolution was the reasonable resolution. That claim would betray
the court's obligation to reach reasoned decisions even as it
professed to discharge that obligation, and the ruling itself would be
so fact-specific that it would fail to possess the generality required of
law. Yet there is nothing unusual about the case. The rulings
produced by ordinary negligence cases typically are so fact-specific
that they do not apply beyond the circumstances at hand, and do not
yield general "rules." There is thus no occasion to exercise the
distinctively legal authority of judges.
The distinctive authority of juries in negligence cases depends
on the special authority that they have to resolve reasonable
disagreement. The reasonable person standard of negligence law
claims a presumptively universal range of application and invokes a
common moral conception. Each and every member of the
community owes and is owed the obligation to impose only
reasonable risks, and reasonableness itself is an irreducibly moral
notion concerned with what we owe to each other. We act
reasonably when we take the relevant rights or interests of other
people who might be affected by our actions as a circumstance
capable of affecting our conduct, and seek to act in ways that could
be justified to them.'72 When reasonable people disagree about the
culpability of a particular defendant's conduct, conflicting judgments
about the reasonableness of that conduct are prima facie plausible.
The defendant is entitled to have his or her conduct appraised by the
moral conception that we hold in common, yet we are divided over
how that conception applies to the defendant's conduct, and
conduct).
171. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975).
172. For elaboration of these points, see Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1, at 279-81.
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justifiably so. We must work our way from reasonable disagreement
to reasonable agreement.
Judicial articulation of law and jury adjudication both have
distinctive roles to play in the construction of reasonable agreement
in negligence law. The judicial elaboration, extension and revision
of law lays claim to being the articulation of reasonable norms that
are general enough to guide conduct. Ideally, the norms of
reasonable conduct that courts spell out in negligence cases are
norms that people themselves would recognize as eminently
reasonable if and when they consider the matter.173 By defining the
domain of the jury as the domain where reasonable people might
reasonably disagree over the application of law to fact, jury
adjudication takes over precisely when it is no longer possible for
judges to articulate evidently reasonable norms. In its turn, jury
application of negligence law to particular cases lays claim to being a
fair way of resolving sharp disagreement over just what due care
calls for in particular cases. Because negligence law's norm of
reasonableness claims to apply a shared moral conception to
determine what we owe to each other, it is fairer for a plurality of
reasonable persons to settle reasonable disagreements over the
adequacy of a defendant's care after full development of relevant
facts and arguments, than it is for judges to settle such disagreement
by determining matters to their own satisfaction before the facts are
developed and the arguments aired.174
Jury adjudication attempts to resolve reasonable disagreement in
a principled and procedurally fair way by enjoining co-deliberation
among a community of reasonable persons who form a microcosm of
the community governed by the norm that they are applying to
others. By virtue of their plurality and diversity, juries are far more
likely than individual judges to embody the range of reasonable
173. The reasons for this run quite deep. For an additional discussion, see Keating, supra
note 162, at 373-79. Cf RIPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 108 (explaining that we can presume the
foreseeability of reasonable conduct because we are entitled to expect others to behave
reasonably).
174. Not all legal standards are tied to a common moral conception. The Uniform
Commercial Code makes heavy use of standards in its effort to embed the actual morality of
commercial communities into commercial law, for example. Consistent with this aspiration, Karl
Llewellyn, the principal drafter of the Code, proposed the use of "merchant juries" to resolve
commercial disputes. See Abusing "Duty," supra note 1, at 280 n.43. The strong tie between
negligence law and jury adjudication stems from both the properties of standards in contrast to
rules and from the fact that reasonableness is a basic "intuitive moral idea." Id. at 281 n.44.
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disagreement over the conduct at issue in a negligence case. Unlike
judicial determinations of "no duty," jury adjudication proceeds on a
fully developed factual record and reaches judgment after the airing
of competing viewpoints on the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct. It is thus designed not to ignore or override the diverse
viewpoints and biases that lead to reasonable disagreement, but
rather to engage and reshape them in order to reach reasonable
agreement.175 The prevailing understanding of duty and breach thus
divides the labor of negligence adjudication between judge and jury
in a principled way. Duty doctrine, properly deployed, assigns to
judges the decidedly legal task of articulating the law-of stating
general norms for the guidance of conduct. Breach doctrine,
properly deployed, assigns to juries the task of evaluating conduct
when the reasonableness of that conduct is subject to legitimate
disagreement, and when the resolution of that disagreement will not
lead to the making of general law.
This, of course, is abstract. So let us make it more complete by
revisiting two cases-KFC'76 and Record v. Reason177-which
Abusing "Duty" criticizes and Shielding Duty defends, at least in
part.
V. RECORD V. REASON: JUDGES AS JURIES
Record v. Reason involved a "tubing" accident. Reason was
piloting a motor boat and towing Record in an inner tube.'78 Record
had a preexisting neck injury, and there was testimony-from both
Record and a "spotter" on the back of the boat-that plaintiff had
175. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law As Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification
for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2393-2410 (1990). Legal opinions recognize this
point. It is, writes the court in Havas v. Victory Paper Stock Co., 402 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 1980),
particularly appropriate to leave [a finding of negligence] to the jury, not only because
of the idiosyncratic nature of most tort cases..., or because there was room for a
difference in view as to whether [the defendant's] conduct in the particular
circumstances of this case did or did not evidence a lack of due care, but, perhaps
above all, because, in the determination of issues revolving about the reasonableness of
conduct, the values inherent in the jury system are rightfully believed an important
instrument in the adjudicative process.
In her important dissents to the California Supreme Court's "no duty" decisions that we criticize,
Justice Kennard has also emphasized the role of the jury. See, e.g, Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc.
v. Superior Ct. (KFC), 927 P.2d 1260, 1278 (Cal. 1997).
176. See, e.g, KFC, 927 P.2d 1260.
177. Record v. Reason, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Ct. App. 1999).
178. Id. at 549.
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specifically told defendant (who knew of the injury) to "'go slow and
take it easy."" 79 Record suffered a serious spinal injury when he was
thrown from the tube as Reason executed a left turn.180 The speed
and angle at which Reason turned the boat were disputed. Defendant
himself claimed "that the boat was traveling 15 to 25 miles per hour.
. and that he made a gradual left turn."18' This claim was disputed
by Robin Perron, one of the two "spotters" on the back of the boat.
18 2
She reported that Reason "was making a sharp left turn," that "the
boat's speedometer read 30 miles per hour" and that the "tow line
[connecting plaintiff to the boat] was at least 70 feet long."' 8 3 She
also testified to a conversation between Reason and Patrick Lynch,
the fourth member of the boating party, "about a game the two [of
them] were playing where the object was 'to try and knock one
another off the tube using [the] speed and momentum of the boat."" 84
Plaintiff himself estimated that the speed of the inner tube during the
turn "approached 50 to 60 miles per hour."'85
Invoking the doctrine of "primary" assumption of risk, the
California Court of Appeal took it upon itself "to define the nature of
the activity [and] the parties' relationship to it,"'18 6 and subsequently
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. First, the court
concluded that "tubing" was the kind of activity to which "primary
assumption of risk" applies. Second, under cloak of its authority to
determine the "existence and scope of a defendant's duty of care,"'
18 7
the court decided that the risk out of which plaintiff's injury arose
was "inherent" in the activity of "tubing."'88 Whatever one makes of
179. Id. at 550.
180. Id. at 549.
181. Id. at 550.
182. Id. at 549 (describing how the role of the "spotter" is "to watch [the tuber] and, if he fell
off the tube, to notify [the pilot] and raise a red flag to inform other boaters that someone was in
the water.").
183. Id. at 558, 550. There was expert testimony that the tube involved in the accident came
with an instruction "never [to] exceed 25 mph when towing adults" and that tow ropes should be
50 feet long. Id. at 549-51.
184. Id. at 550. Record testified that Lynch's "exact words [after the incident] were, 'You
were going way too "F'n" fast.' Or, 'You were going "F'n" fast.' He made comments that I
looked like a rag doll bouncing across the water."' Id. (alteration in original).
185. Id. at551,n.2.
186. Id. at 555.
187. Id. at 555.
188. Id. at 556.
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it, the conclusion that "tubing," like waterskiing, is the kind of
vigorous recreational activity to which the doctrine of primary
assumption of risk applies189 is an exercise in fixing the legal
standard that governs the activity at hand. The court's affirmation of
summary judgment, however, crosses the boundary between law
articulation and law application, treating matters that are plainly not
matters of law as though they are.
Record thus involved a dispute as to what sort of "tubing" took
place--"tubing" tempered by a mutual understanding that defendant
was to take care not to aggravate plaintiffs preexisting injury, or the
kind of high-speed "tubing" that is more readily analogized to
waterskiing. 90 This may be a question of pure "fact," as the dissent
asserts.19' Or it may be a "mixed" question of law and fact, turning
both on what the parties said and did and on evaluative judgment
about just how the enterprise that they agreed to should be
characterized. But it is not, in any standard or convincing usage, a
"pure" question of "law." The court's rejection of the argument that
driving too fast can constitute reckless activity (not immunized by
189. "Primary" assumption of the risk is supposed to track the shared-and hence
"objective"-understanding held by participants in an activity. Record invites the worry that the
court is imposing its understanding on the activity, instead of reconstructing the participants'
shared understanding of their common enterprise. "Tubing" may be a poor candidate for primary
assumption of risk because it is an informal activity which can be conducted gently as well as
vigorously. There may simply not be a core enterprise common to all instances of "tubing,"
which would be chilled by the recognition of duties of due care. See id. at 554 ("[A]ppellant
described the enjoyment a rider receives from tubing as ranging from, the 'simple pleasure' of
being casually towed behind the boat to the 'thrill' of the boat turning rapidly to get the inner
tuber to go much quicker."); see also id. at 560 (Vogel, J., dissenting). A point-and perhaps the
point-of "tubing" in a tame way is to minimize any risks of serious injury. The court's
extension of "primary assumption of risk" to "tubing" is not, however, the principal reason why
the decision is problematic.
190. After noting that instances of tubing fall on a continuum from gentle to very vigorous,
the court disposes of the problem that this presents by acknowledging that an express
understanding between the participants could take "tubing" out of the domain of "primary"
assumption of risk, but then announcing that (as a matter of law) Record did not offer enough
evidence to make out such an understanding. Id. at 555 n.3 (majority opinion). Bear in mind that
this conclusion about the strength of Record's evidence is reached in affirming a motion for
summary judgment.
191. Id. at 558 (Vogel, J., dissenting). Judge Vogel wrote, in his dissent:
[I]t is evident that there are disputed issues of material fact regarding the existence of
an explicit understanding between appellant and respondent and, if so, whether
respondent failed to abide by that understanding. That factual dispute must be decided
before it can be concluded that appellant's claim is barred by primary assumption of
risk as a matter of law.
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Knight v. Jewett'9 2); its holding that imposing any speed limits at all
would chill the activity;'93 and its willful overlooking of the
testimony that the defendant had actually discussed deliberately
attempting to knock the passenger out of the inner tube by speeding
and turning sharply; are all egregious.
Individually and jointly, these decisions treat a question of law
application for the jury-whether the risk that materialized was or
was not "inherent" in the activity of "tubing"-as a question of law
articulation for the court.
The court's conclusions are not necessarily unreasonable. We
can certainly imagine a jury deciding to credit the testimony that the
boat was traveling at only 15-25 miles per hour; or concluding that
traveling 30 miles per hour (thus exceeding the recommended
maximum speed by 5 miles per hour) and using a tow rope 20 feet
too long was not egregious enough to exceed the boundary of the
risks assumed, or, if egregious enough, did not cause plaintiffs
injury. A jury could also reasonably conclude that, under the
circumstances at hand, plaintiff needed to do more than simply make
a general request that defendant drive the boat slowly. But a
reasonable jury could also draw opposite conclusions: that plaintiff
and defendant had agreed that they were going to engage in a mild
form of "tubing" in which the boat's speed would be carefully
controlled; that driving even 5 miles an hour (20 percent) above the
recommended speed limit was too dangerous, especially when the
tow rope was too long; that in fact the defendant was driving the boat
above 30 miles per hour and causing the tube to reach clearly unsafe
speeds of 50-60 miles per hour; and that the defendant was
deliberately and unsafely trying to knock the plaintiff out of the inner
tube. These are classic jury questions. In deciding them, the court is
acting as the trier of fact.
It is hard not to see a resemblance between what the Record
court is doing and the conception of "relational duty" that Goldberg
and Zipursky champion, even though Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky are themselves troubled by the case.'94 When wrongs must
192. 834 P.2d 696, 712 (Cal. 1992).
193. Record, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
194. See Shielding Duty, supra note 36, at 342-45. Goldberg and Zipursky agree that Record
should have gone to the jury because they believe that the court should have applied assumption
of risk in its secondary and "true" form. Doing so would have required a particularized, factual
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be personal to the plaintiffs who plead them, the relationship
between this particular plaintiff and this particular defendant on these
particular facts is a fit subject for judicial inquiry. A strongly
relational conception of duty thus suits a court disposed to sit in
judgment of the facts of a case as an additional, gate-keeping jury,
determining whether the plaintiff will ever get to present his case to
the real one.'95
VI. KFC: DETERMINING DUTY WITHOUT ARTICULATING LAW
Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court
("KFC') 9 6 is extensively discussed in Abusing "Duty. "197 We will
revisit it only briefly here. As framed by the California Supreme
Court, the issue in KFC was whether a shopkeeper has "a duty to
inquiry into the parties' states of mind. That kind of inquiry falls within the jurisdiction of the
jury. Tellingly, Goldberg and Zipursky also argue that we cannot coherently object to having the
case taken from the jury because we believe that the "no duty" doctrine of primary assumption of
the risk can be applied to the case. Id. at 343 ("[P]rimary assumption of risk [is] a question of law
[for the court, not a question of fact for the jury]."). By assuming that duty analysis encompasses
both law articulation and law application, this criticism unwittingly illustrates just how
compatible Goldberg and Zipursky's conception of duty is with the California courts' ongoing
abuse of duty.
195. While claiming to maintain adherence to the Knight primary assumption of risk doctrine,
including the prong that holds that the inherent risks of the activity are determined by courts as a
matter of law, the California Supreme Court has begun to "walk back" at least the signals that it
sent lower courts in Knight, indicating that they could and should grant summary judgments for
defendants in cases where there were disputed facts. See Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 724 (Cal.
1992); see also Cheong v. Antablin, 946 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1997); Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co.,
905 P.2d 418 (Cal. 1995). Thus, Kahn v. East Side Union High School District, 75 P.3d 30 (Cal.
2003), holds that a high school swimmer who was encouraged by her coach to try a dangerous
dive that she was not ready for had raised a triable issue of fact that the coach's conduct was
reckless and thus actionable under Knight. Id. at 44. Similarly, Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal.
2007), holds that there was a triable issue of fact as to recklessness where a golfer hit another
golfer with an errant shot and there was a factual dispute as to whether the golfer saw the other
golfer before lining up to tee off. In City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (Janeway), 161
P.3d 1095 (Cal. 2007), the court held that while waivers of ordinary negligence actions were
enforceable, waivers of actions for gross negligence violated public policy. The court did not
disturb the lower courts' findings that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for gross
negligence based on a lifeguard's split-second looking away from a developmentally disabled
child in a swimming pool which resulted in the child drowning. Id. at 1118. Cases like Kahn,
Shin, and Janeway appear to use recklessness and gross negligence as a proxy for negligence, and
appear inconsistent with earlier court of appeal cases involving sports coaches and golfers where
no triable issues of fact were found.
This demonstrates another problem with particularistic conceptions of duty. When
courts take it upon themselves to issue rulings of law as detailed as the ones now being issued, the
result is a hopelessly confused doctrine, in which courts and lawyers parse fact patterns in pursuit
of minute and meaningless distinctions in order to reconcile conflicting cases.
196. 927 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1997).
197. See generally Abusing "Duty, " supra note 1.
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comply with the unlawful demand of an armed robber that property
be surrendered."' 98 The KFC employee refused to turn over the cash
in the register and, as a result, the robber took the plaintiff hostage
and held her at gunpoint. Goldberg and Zipursky are, of course,
correct that this was essentially a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. However, there is no doubt that under Dillon v.
Legg199 and case law preceding it, the plaintiffs claim arose out of a
risk to her physical safety and that her claim therefore fell within an
exception to the general rule prohibiting recovery for NIED °°
But the California Supreme Court barred recovery, as a matter
of law and on a different ground."' It held that business owners owe
"no duty" to turn over the cash in the cash register to an armed
robber in order to protect the business's patrons.2 The Court's
holding would therefore extend to a situation where plaintiff had
been shot and injured. The Court thus holds that the property rights
of the restaurant-over a very small amount of money in the cash
register-take absolute precedence over the physical safety of the
patrons. The competing claims of potential victims to the safety of
their persons do not even have to be considered. Once an unlawful
demand to surrender business property is made, businesses may be as
negligent as they please with the safety of their customers "no matter
how insignificant the object and no matter how slightly it is
jeopardized... no matter how many [customers are endangered] and
no matter how gravely they are threatened.""2 3  In KFC, property
rights trump "the right to life"-but only, it seems, on the facts of the
case. This is a very narrowly drawn ruling: "we need not decide if
th[e] right [to defend property] is qualified by the duty to avoid
injury to third persons or if a duty exists to avoid physical resistance
that might provoke a robber into carrying out a threat of harm to
third persons.'"204
198. KFC, 927 P.2d at 1262 (an armed robber had demanded the cash in the register at a KFC
outlet).
199. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
200. Id. at 919.
201. KFC, 927 P.2d at 1270.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1270 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Recall that a business does have a general duty to
protect customers who visit its premises from assault by third parties. This "duty" is an exception
to that general duty.
204. See id. (majority opinion).
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Goldberg and Zipursky contend that our real complaint is with
the political conservatism of the California Supreme Court in
privileging private property rights over the interests in physical
security that tort law seeks to protect. We certainly do believe that
KFC embodies a wrongheaded privileging of property over life. But
we also believe that KFC illustrates an unworkably particular
approach to "duty." To see this, it helps to bear in mind that,
formally speaking, duty doctrine is performing its proper role in
KFC. By giving absolute priority to the claims of property, the
decision fixes a boundary between property and tort. In the
circumstances covered by the case, shopkeepers can be "as negligent
as they please" with the lives of their customers. But the ruling is so
closely tailored to the particular facts of the case that it does not
define a domain large enough to orient either future conduct or future
legal decisions.
The law in place after KFC prescribes that there is: (1) a general
duty to protect customers from assault at the hands of third parties on
the premises; (2) "no duty" to comply with an unlawful demand that
property be surrendered; and (3) uncertainty as to whether the "right
[to defend property] is qualified by [a] duty to avoid injury to third
persons or if a duty exists to avoid physical resistance that might
provoke a robber into carrying out a threat to harm third persons. 2 5
"Physical resistance," we gather, is different from a mere refusal to
comply with an unlawful demand that property be surrendered. And
"[p]rovok[ing] a robber into carrying out a threat to harm third
persons ' 2°6 is a step beyond provoking a robber into credibly
threatening to harm third persons. Only after that threat fails and
someone is harmed, will we learn if there was a duty to yield to the
threat and so to have prevented that harm. This is not a categorical
proclamation that the shopkeeper's privilege to defend its property
preempts the customer's claim to safety. It is a judgment that the
privilege trumps on these exact facts. "No breach as a matter of law"
based on these particular facts is the way to express a conclusion this
narrow.
20 7
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 1273-74 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (explaining that because the "emergency
rule" might be invoked to hold the store employee to a relaxed standard of care, a ruling that there
was no breach as a matter of law is at least plausible, if not necessarily persuasive).
Summer 2008] 1291
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol.41:1225
Put otherwise, KFC relies on the idea that duty is a live issue in
every case. This idea is, indeed, precisely what the Court must use to
justify its conclusion that, as a matter of law, a business never has a
duty to comply with a robber's demands for the cash in its register in
order to protect the safety of its customers. If duty doctrine had been
confined to its traditional roles of limiting obligation to
circumstances where harm to someone is reasonably foreseeable-
and fixing special rules of greater or lesser obligation in classes of
cases where we have good reason to recognize heightened or
lessened obligation of care-KFC simply could not have been
decided as it was. The existence of a duty to protect the physical
safety of patrons during a robbery would be presumptively settled by
the broad rule of Rowland v. Christian that business invitees are
owed reasonable care, nothing more and nothing less.2"8
Under the rule that everyone owes everyone else a duty of
reasonable care, it is up to the jury-not the judge-to determine
whether a defendant's interest in protecting its property justifies not
handing the cash in its register over to a robber. That is simply a
matter of deciding whether the benefit of protecting the receipts in
the register are worth the risk to human life created by a failure to
acquiesce to the robber's demand.
Under Dillon (and case law preceding it), the extent of liability
for breach of that duty extends to emotional distress caused by
conduct that risks physical harm to the plaintiff. A court that wanted
to cut back on Rowland would have to state a rule of some
generality, and that rule would have to articulate a principled
boundary on defendant's duty of care, a boundary fixed and
supported by plaintiffs property rights. The California Supreme
208. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). In Marshall v. Burger King Corp.,
856 N.E.2d 1048 (Il. 2006), the Supreme Court of Illinois analyzed whether a fast food
restaurant owed a duty to a customer who was dining when a automobile smashed into the
building, killing the customer. The Illinois Supreme Court applied a multifactor balancing test
similar to Rowland v. Christian, but declined Burger King's invitation to fashion a rule of "no
duty" tailored to the particular facts of the case. 856 N.E.2d at 1061.
[T]o the extent defendants suggest we could create a [narrow] rule of law.., to
absolve them of liability, they are actually requesting that we determine, as a matter of
law, that they did not breach their duty of care. It is inadvisable for courts to conflate
the concepts of duty and breach in this manner. Courts could, after all, state an infinite
number of duties if they spoke in highly particular terms, and while particularized
statements of duty may be comprehensible, they use the term duty to state conclusions
about the facts of particular cases, not as a general standard.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court would have to articulate its quasi-libertarian conviction that
life may be endangered to preserve property in a general and
principled way.
VII. CONCLUSION
The California courts, of course, are responsible for their own
decisions. Professors Goldberg and Zipursky are not. But their
strongly relational conception of duty is more likely to reinforce than
to restrain the abuse of duty now afoot in California. Make duty
"relational," in the robust sense that Goldberg and Zipursky
advocate, and courts can deny plaintiffs recovery and take cases
away from the jury whenever that strikes them as appropriate given
the relationship between this plaintiff and this defendant on these
facts. In a case like KFC, the question becomes whether this
particular restaurant owed this particular customer a duty not to hand
this robber the money in its register. The preliminary question of
duty metamorphoses into the ultimate question of liability.
Relational duty as Goldberg and Zipursky conceive it is thus as
supportive of excessively particular duty rulings as any form of
instrumentalism run amok. An excessively personal conception of
duty is both a license to pursue preferred outcomes, and at war with
the premise that everyone owes everyone else a duty of reasonable
care. An excessively personal conception of duty obscures and
erodes the great achievement of twentieth century tort law-its
recognition that the equal right to the physical integrity of one's
person trumps the free use of property and the unfettered pursuit of
mutual advantage in the marketplace.
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